31 Δεκεμβρίου 2015

Σαν φτάσουν τα μεγάλα κρύα...

Μόνο σαν φτάσουν τα μεγάλα κρύα, ξέρουμε πως ο κέδρος και το κυπαρίσσι είναι τα τελευταία δένδρα που φυλλορροούν.

29 Δεκεμβρίου 2015

Σχόλια ἀτάκτως ἐρριμμένα (29 Δεκ 2015).

Ι
Οι ΑμερικανοΑσιάτες (Asian Americans) έχουν το υψηλότερο μορφωτικό επίπεδο και το υψηλότερο μέσο εισόδημα -ανά νοικοκυριό- από οποιαδήποτε άλλη φυλετική ομάδα (racial group) στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, σύμφωνα με έρευνα που διεξήχθη το 2012 σε εθνικό επίπεδο από το Pew Research Center. Επίσης, ο πληθυσμός των ΑσιατοΑμερικανών αυξάνεται γρηγορότερα από οποιαδήποτε άλλη φυλετική ομάδα στις Η.Π.Α. Από το 2000 έως το 2010 ο αριθμός των ανθρώπων που αυτοπροσδιορίζονταν ως -εν μέρει ή εξ ολοκλήρου- Ασιάτες αυξήθηκε κατά 46%, τουλάχιστον τέσσερις φορές περισσότερο από το ρυθμό αύξησης του συνολικού πληθυσμού. Στην έρευνα διαπιστώθηκε πως οι ΑμερικανοΑσιάτες δίνουν μεγαλύτερη αξία στο γάμο, τη μητρότητα, τη σκληρή δουλειά και την επιτυχημένη καριέρα (marriage, parenthood, hard work, career success) από τους υπόλοιπους Αμερικανούς. Το 1965 οι ΑσιατοΑμερικανοί αποτελούσαν λιγότερο από το 1,0% του πληθυσμού των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών. Σήμερα αποτελούν περίπου το 4,8% (wholly Asian) ή σχεδόν το 6,0% (partly Asian). Ο πληθυσμός τους υπολογίζεται περί τα 18 εκατομμύρια.

25 Δεκεμβρίου 2015

Η Μήδεια του Ευρυπίδη στο Τόκιο. 平幹二朗・主演の「王女メディア」、東京グローブ座で2016年1月から公演.

Η τραγωδία Μήδεια του Ευρυπίδη θα ανέβει στο Τόκιο από τις 9 μέχρι τις 16 Ιανουαρίου 2016, με πρωταγωνιστή τον μεγάλο Ιάπωνα ηθοποιό Μικιτζίρο Χίρα και σκηνοθεσία του Τέτσου Ταοσίτα. Θέατρο The Globe Tokyo. 3-1-2 Hyakunin-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.

24 Δεκεμβρίου 2015

Παγκόσμιες πληθυσμιακές εξελίξεις (1950-2015).

Τα στοιχεία που ακολουθούν αποτελούν συνέχεια και συμπλήρωμα των επόμενων σημειωμάτων: 1) Παγκόσμιες πληθυσμιακές εξελίξεις και «Δύση», 2) Τρία σχόλια για τον πλανητικό μετασχηματισμό: Περί «Δύσεως», πολυπληθέστερων χωρών και μεγεθών αστικοποίησης, 3) Παγκόσμια, δυτικά και ευρωπαϊκά οικονομικά και πληθυσμιακά μεγέθη κατά τον πλανητικό μετασχηματισμό, 4) II) Ανατολική Ασία, Βόρεια Αμερική και Ευρώπη. Μεγέθη και στοιχεία με βάση την οικονομική, πολιτική και ιστορική Γεωγραφία. I) Εξέλιξη ανεπτυγμένων οικονομιών (G7) και αναδυόμενων και αναπτυσσόμενων οικονομίων της Ασίας (Emerging and developing Asia) από τη δεκαετία του 1980 έως σήμερα, 5) I. Άνοδος και πτώση αυτοκρατοριών. Η.Π.Α - Κίνα - Ρωσία - Η.Β (1820-2020) II. Ασία - Β. Αμερική - Ε.Ε (1950-2020). GDP based (PPP) share of world total (%). Πλανητικός μετασχηματισμός.


Δέκα (10) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες (1950 και 2015)

Το 1950 οι δέκα πολυπληθέστερες χώρες ήταν οι εξής: 1) Κίνα με 544 εκατομμύρια, 2) Ινδία με 376 εκατομμύρια, 3) Η.Π.Α με 158 εκατομμύρια, 4) Ρωσία με 103 εκατομμύρια, 5) Ιαπωνία με 82 εκατομμύρια, 6) Γερμανία με 70 εκατομμύρια, 7) Ινδονησία με 70 εκατομμύρια, 8) Βραζιλία με 54 εκατομμύρια, 9) Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο με 50 εκατομμύρια και, τέλος, 10) Ιταλία με 47 εκατομμύρια.

Δέκα (10) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες (1950)


Το 2015 οι δέκα πολυπληθέστερες χώρες είναι οι εξής: 1) Κίνα με 1.376 εκατομμύρια, 2) Ινδία με 1.311 εκατομμύρια, 3) Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες με 322 εκατομμύρια, 4) Ινδονησία με 258 εκατομμύρια, 5) Βραζιλία με 208 εκατομμύρια, 6) Πακιστάν με 189 εκατομμύρια, 7) Νιγηρία με 182 εκατομμύρια, 8) Μπαγκλαντές με 161 εκατομμύρια, 9) Ρωσία με 143 εκατομμύρια και, τέλος, 10) Μεξικό ή/και Ιαπωνία με 127 εκατομμύρια (απολύτως οριακά).

Δέκα (10) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες (2015)


Μεγαλύτερες πληθυσμιακές μεταβολές-αυξήσεις (1950-2015)

  • Ινδία: 935 εκατομμύρια
  • Κίνα: 832 εκατομμύρια
  • Ινδονησία: 188 εκατομμύρια
  • Η.Π.Α: 164 εκατομμύρια
  • Βραζιλία: 154 εκατομμύρια
  • Πακιστάν: 149 εκατομμύρια (το 1950 είχε πληθυσμό περίπου 40 εκατομμύρια και βρισκόταν εκτός πρώτης δεκάδας)
  • Νιγηρία: 147 εκατομμύρια (το 1950 είχε πληθυσμό περίπου 35 εκατομμύρια, ομοίως)
  • Μπαγκλαντές: 118 εκατομμύρια (το 1950 είχε πληθυσμό 43 εκατομμύρια -λίγο περισσότερο από τη Γαλλία-, ομοίως)
  • Μεξικό: 100 εκατομμύρια (το 1950 είχε πληθυσμό περίπου 27 εκατομμύρια -όσο περίπου η Ισπανία-, ομοίως)

Ηπειρωτική ματιά στα πολυπληθέστερα κράτη (1950-2015)

Το 1950 τρεις ευρωπαϊκές χώρες (πλην Ρωσίας) συγκαταλέγονταν στις δέκα πολυπληθέστερες του πλανήτη. Το 2015 καμία (πλην Ρωσίας). Και στις πρώτες δεκαπέντε (15) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες δεν υπάρχει καμία ευρωπαϊκή χώρα (πλην Ρωσίας πάντα). Η Γερμανία βρίσκεται στην 16η θέση, κάτω από την Αίγυπτο και πάνω (;) από το Ιράν (το Ιράν θα την ξεπεράσει, εάν δεν την έχει ήδη ξεπεράσει). Μέσα στην επόμενη δεκαετία ούτε στις πρώτες είκοσι (20) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες θα υπάρχει κάποια ευρωπαϊκή χώρα (πλην Ρωσίας πάντα).

Το 1950 δύο αμερικανικές χώρες (μια στη Νότια και μια στη Βόρεια Αμερική) συγκαταλέγονταν στις δέκα πολυπληθέστερες χώρες του πλανήτη. Το 2015 τρεις (Η.Π.Α, Βραζιλία, Μεξικό).

Το 1950 καμία αφρικανική χώρα δεν ήταν μεταξύ των δέκα πολυπληθέστερων χωρών του πλανήτη. Το 2015 βρίσκεται μια (Νιγηρία). Στις πρώτες είκοσι (20) χώρες συγκαταλέγονται τέσσερις (Νιγηρία, Αιθιοπία, Αίγυπτος, Κονγκό).

Το 1950 τέσσερις ασιατικές χώρες (πλην Ρωσίας, η οποία λόγω έκτασης και γεωγραφίας αποτελεί χώρα «πασπαρτού ή γέφυρα») συγκαταλέγονταν στις δέκα πολυπληθέστερες χώρες του πλανήτη. Το 2015 συγκαταλέγονται πέντε χώρες της ευρύτερης Ασίας (Ανατολική Ασία και Ασία του Ειρηνικού) στις πρώτες δέκα (10) και εννέα στις πρώτες είκοσι (20). Κίνα, Ινδία, Ινδονησία, Πακιστάν, Μπαγκλαντές, Ιαπωνία, Φιλιππίνες, Βιετνάμ και Ταϊλάνδη.

Το 1950 καμία χώρα της Μέσης Ανατολής δεν συγκαταλεγόταν στις δέκα πολυπληθέστερες χώρες του πλανήτη. Το ίδιο συμβαίνει και το 2015. Όμως στις πρώτες είκοσι (20) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες υπάρχουν δύο χώρες της Μέσης Ανατολής (Τουρκία και Ιράν) ή τέσσερις της Ευρύτερης Μέσης Ανατολής (Αίγυπτος και Πακιστάν).

Είκοσι (20) πολυπληθέστερες χώρες (2015)


Ηπειρωτική ματιά δίχως κράτη (1950-2015)

Το 1950 ο παγκόσμιος πληθυσμός ήταν περίπου 2,55 δισεκατομμύρια. Το 2015 υπολογίζεται σε 7,3 δισεκατομμύρια. Σε περίοδο εξήντα πέντε (65) χρόνων ο συνολικός πληθυσμός του πλανήτη αυξήθηκε κατά 4 δισεκατομμύρια 750 εκατομμύρια, περίπου.

Στην Ασία κατοικεί το 60% του συνολικού πληθυσμού (Κίνα και Ινδία, από μόνες τους, αποτελούν περίπου το 37% του παγκόσμιου πληθυσμού). Στην Αφρική κατοικεί το 15,5%. Στην Ευρώπη, συμπεριλαμβανομένων όλων των πληθυσμών δυτικά των Ουραλίων -δηλαδή και το μεγαλύτερο πληθυσμιακά μέρος της Ρωσίας- κατοικεί το 10,4% (η Ε.Ε αποτελεί περίπου το 7,0% του παγκόσμιου πληθυσμού ενώ η Ευρωζώνη λιγότερο από το 5,0%). Στην Λατινική Αμερική -συμπεριλαμβανομένης της Καραϊβικής- κατοικεί το 8,6% του παγκόσμιου πληθυσμού και στη Βόρεια Αμερική το 5,0% (Νότια και Βόρεια Αμερική αγγίζουν το 14%).

Μεταξύ των ετών 1950 και 2015, ο συνολικός πληθυσμός του πλανήτη αυξήθηκε κατά 4,75 δισεκατομμύρια -ή κατά 4.750 εκατομμύρια- ενώ αυτός των μεγαλύτερων δυνάμεων της σημερινής Ε.Ε (Γερμανία, Γαλλία, Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο, Ιταλία και Ισπανία) αυξήθηκε κατά 90 μόλις εκατομμύρια.

Αυτό που δεν τονίζεται είναι πως περί το 1900, περίοδος που μεσουρανούσαν ορισμένες ευρωπαϊκές δυνάμεις σε πλανητική κλίμακα, οι δυνάμεις αυτές δεν ήταν μονάχα «τεχνολογικά και οικονομικά» ανεπτυγμένες, αλλά βρίσκονταν και σε μια ήπειρο η οποία αντιπροσώπευε περίπου το 25% του παγκόσμιου πληθυσμού - και όχι το 10% όπως σήμερα. Ένας στους τέσσερις κατοίκους στον πλανήτη προερχόταν από την ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο - και όχι ένας στους δέκα. Η δημογραφία πάντα διαδραματίζει καθοριστικό ρόλο. Περίπου το 70% των είκοσι πολυπληθέστερων χωρών σε πλανητική κλίμακα θα πρωταγωνιστήσουν τον νέο αιώνα.

Όπως έχει παρατηρήσει και ο -σπουδαίος- Angus Maddison, «Μεταξύ των ετών 1000 και 1500, ο πληθυσμός της Δυτικής Ευρώπης αυξήθηκε ταχύτερα από οποιοδήποτε άλλο μέρος του κόσμου. Οι βόρειες χώρες αυξήθηκαν σημαντικά ταχύτερα από τις μεσογειακές» (εκείνη την περίοδο ξεκινά και η αλλαγή στην ισορροπία δυνάμεων μεταξύ μεσογειακής και -δυτικής και βόρειας- ηπειρωτικής Ευρώπης, η οποία παραμένει μέχρι τις μέρες μας, κυριολεκτικά: Ευρωπαϊκός Βορράς-Νότος). Πάντοτε, κάπως έτσι ξεκινά.


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Σε ότι αφορά τον μικρόκοσμο της Ε.Ε: Θυμίζω πως η Γερμανία έχει περί τα 14 με 16 εκατομμύρια περισσότερους κατοίκους από τη Γαλλία και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο (δεδομένο το οποίο σαφώς επηρεάζει πολυπαραγοντικά). Τρεις χώρες που βρίσκονται στην ίδια τεχνολογική βασή. Η Γερμανία έχει πληθυσμό περίπου 81 εκατομμύρια με μέσο όρο ηλικίας τα 46 χρόνια και ρυθμό γονιμότητας 1.40, η Γαλλία 67 εκατομμύρια με μέσο όρο ηλικίας τα 41 χρόνια και ρυθμό γονιμότητας περίπου 2.00 (μεγαλύτερος στην Ε.Ε) και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο 65 εκατομμύρια με μέσο όρο ηλικίας τα 40.5 χρόνια και ρυθμό γονιμότητας περίπου 1.90. Σε αυτό το κείμενο δεν μας ενδιαφέρουν οι μελλοντικές προβολές, απλά, προς ενημέρωση σας, αναφέρω πως εντός των επόμενων δύο δεκαετιών -υπολογίζεται πως- ο πληθυσμός της Γερμανίας θα μειωθεί ενώ οι πληθυσμοί της Γαλλίας και του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου θα αυξηθούν (όσο για εμάς, αφήστε το. Εμείς βρισκόμαστε μεταξύ εκλογίκευσης, στρουθοκαμηλισμού, ιδεολογικοποίησης, απώθησης ή/και νομιμοποίησης του θανάτου μας).


.~`~.
Για περαιτέρω ιχνηλάτηση και πληρέστερη προοπτική

1) Παγκόσμιες πληθυσμιακές εξελίξεις και «Δύση», 2) Τρία σχόλια για τον πλανητικό μετασχηματισμό: Περί «Δύσεως», πολυπληθέστερων χωρών και μεγεθών αστικοποίησης, 3) Παγκόσμια, δυτικά και ευρωπαϊκά οικονομικά και πληθυσμιακά μεγέθη κατά τον πλανητικό μετασχηματισμό, 4) II) Ανατολική Ασία, Βόρεια Αμερική και Ευρώπη. Μεγέθη και στοιχεία με βάση την οικονομική, πολιτική και ιστορική Γεωγραφία. I) Εξέλιξη ανεπτυγμένων οικονομιών (G7) και αναδυόμενων και αναπτυσσόμενων οικονομίων της Ασίας (Emerging and developing Asia) από τη δεκαετία του 1980 έως σήμερα, 5) I. Άνοδος και πτώση αυτοκρατοριών. Η.Π.Α - Κίνα - Ρωσία - Η.Β (1820-2020) II. Ασία - Β. Αμερική - Ε.Ε (1950-2020). GDP based (PPP) share of world total (%). Πλανητικός μετασχηματισμός, 6) Πολιτιστικές μακροδομές: Γενικές παρατηρήσεις για την μετακίνηση του κέντρου βάρους της χριστιανικής ανθρωπογεωγραφίας προς τον Παγκόσμιο Νότο, 7) I) Ένας -ακόμη- ενδοευρωπαϊκος ανταγωνισμός ανάμεσα σε χώρες του Βορρά και του Νότου και II) μια σύντομη αναφορά στις σχέσεις Τουρκίας και Ε.Ε., 8) Κέντρα και περιφέρειες 9) Μια σύντομη μακροϊστορική προσέγγιση των ευρωπαϊκών εξελίξεων.

22 Δεκεμβρίου 2015

Δύο σχολιασμοί: I) Η δημογραφική καταστροφή της Ιαπωνίας και II) Τα πράγματα ήρθαν αλλιώς (στις σχέσεις «Ευρώπης» και «Ισλάμ»).

I
Η δημογραφική καταστροφή της Ιαπωνίας

Η ιαπωνική κυβέρνηση όρισε ως στόχο της να σταθεροποιήσει τον πληθυσμό της χώρας στα 100 εκατομμύρια μέσα στα επόμενα 50 χρόνια, σπάζοντας ένα μεταπολεμικό πολιτικό ταμπού (γιατί όμως ήταν «ταμπού»;). Μια συναίνεση επανεμφανίζεται που παραδέχεται πως οι δημογραφικές τάσεις αποτελούν καθοριστικό παράγοντα για την τύχη των εθνών (γιατί είχε χαθεί αυτή η συναίνεση;).

Ο πληθυσμός της Ιαπωνίας κορυφώθηκε το 2008 με περίπου 128 εκατομμύρια και έκτοτε μειώνεται (κάτι που σημαίνει πως η μείωση στους ρυθμούς γονιμότητας είχε ξεκινήσει πολύ νωρίτερα). Μέχρι το 2040, η Ιαπωνία ενδέχεται να χάνει περί το ένα εκατομμύριο ανθρώπους κάθε χρόνο.

Εάν δεν αλλάξει κάτι δραματικά, μέχρι το 2050 ο πληθυσμός της Ιαπωνίας αναμένεται να μειωθεί στα 105 εκατομμύρια αναφέρει έκθεση του Ο.Η.Ε. Ενώ με βάση άλλη έρευνα μέχρι τέλος του αιώνα ο πληθυσμός της Ιαπωνίας υπολογίζεται πως θα μπορούσε να επιστρέψει στα επίπεδα των αρχών του 20ου αιώνα (μονάχα που το 1900 ήμασταν 1,6 δισεκατομμύρια ενώ μέχρι το τέλος του αιώνα υπολογίζεται πως θα είμαστε πάνω από 11 δισεκατομμύρια).

«Οι ιδιοκτήτες σκυλιών στην Ιαπωνία, θεωρούν ότι το σκυλί είναι σαν παιδί», ισχυρίζεται η Toshiko Horikoshi, επιτυχημένη χειρούργος που κατοικεί σε μια ακριβή περιοχή του Τόκυο, κυκλοφορεί με Porsche και παίζει πιάνο για να χαλαρώσει. Πολλές γιαπωνέζες σαν την Horikoshi -διαβάζω στον Guardian- προτιμούν τα κατοικίδια ζώα από τη μητρότητα. Αποτελεί έκπληξη, σε μια χώρα που πανικοβάλλονται για την κατακόρυφη πτώση των γεννήσεων, ότι υπάρχουν τώρα πολλά περισσότερα κατοικίδια ζώα από ότι παιδιά. Ενώ το ποσοστό των γεννήσεων έχει μειωθεί δραματικά και ο μέσος όρος ηλικίας του πληθυσμού της Ιαπωνίας έχει αυξηθεί, η Ιαπωνία έχει μεταβληθεί σε «πλανητική υπερδύναμη» κατοικίδιων ζωών. Και βέβαια έχει δημιουργηθεί μια πανίσχυρη βιομηχανία γύρω από τα κατοικίδια που έχει οδηγήσει οίκους μόδας, σχεδίασης κ.λπ όπως Chanel, Dior, Gucci και Hermès να προσφέρουν πολυτελή προϊόντα για σκύλους. Σε αρκετές περιοχές του Τόκυο είναι ευκολότερο να βρεις ρούχα για σκυλιά παρά για παιδιά. Υπάρχουν Boutique κατοικίδιων που πουλάνε τα πάντα.

Επίσημες εκτιμήσεις ανεβάζουν τον αριθμό των κατοικίδιων στην Ιαπωνία σε 22 εκατομμύρια -ή και περισσότερο-, ενώ υπάρχουν μόνο 16,6 εκατομμύρια παιδιά κάτω των 15 ετών.

Στην Ιαπωνία κυκλοφορούν περισσότερες πάνες για σκυλιά και ηλικιωμένους από ότι για παιδιά. Έτσι από τα σκυλιά και γενικότερα τα κατοικίδια παίρναμε στους ηλικιωμένους. Οι πάνες για ηλικιωμένους αναμένεται να ξεπεράσουν σε πωλήσεις τις πάνες μωρών στην Ιαπωνία μέχρι το 2020, σύμφωνα με την Unicharm, τη μεγαλύτερη εταιρεία κατασκευής πάνας στην Ιαπωνία. Το σημείο καμπής ήταν το 2011.

Στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1990 ο ρυθμός γονιμότητας στην Ιαπωνία έπεσε κάτω από 1,5 (ιστορικό χαμηλό για την Ιαπωνία το 1,26 κατά το έτος 2005 - ενώ στην Ελλάδα την περίοδο 2000-2003 ο ρυθμός γονιμότητας κινήθηκε μεταξύ 1,26 και 1,28). Το 1995, ο πληθυσμός των συνταξιούχων στην Ιαπωνία (65 ετών και άνω) αντιπροσώπευε το 14,6 % επί του συνολικού πληθυσμού ενώ το 1950 ήταν μόλις 4,9%. Το 1950 η μέση ηλικία ήταν 22,3 έτη ενώ το 1995 άγγιξε τα 40 έτη. Σήμερα η μέση ηλικία είναι 46 έτη. Ένας στους τέσσερις Ιάπωνες είναι άνω των εξήντα πέντε χρόνων. Η Ιαπωνία είναι η πιο γερασμένη κοινωνία στον πλανήτη - με τη Γερμανία να ακολουθεί και την Ελλάδα να βρίσκεται στην πρώτη πεντάδα.



Σύνδεσμοι: 1) Why Japan's Elderly Are Endangering Its Military 2) Why Japan prefers pets to parenthood 3) In Rapidly Aging Japan, Adult Diaper Sales Are About to Surpass Baby Diapers 4) See the 'super-aged' nations 5) http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/japan.pdf


II
Τα πράγματα ήρθαν αλλιώς

Εν συντομία. Το επίδικο -για ορισμένους- ήταν η ενσωμάτωση «του Ισλάμ» στην «ευρωπαϊκή» παραγωγή -καθώς το πρώτο αποτελεί βασικό παράγοντα υπάρξεως της δεύτερης- όχι μονάχα ως «ενέργεια» (πετρέλαια κυρίως) και «εργασία» («φτηνά εργατικά χέρια») αλλά και ως «παιδιά και γεννήσεις» (υπογεννητικότητα και δημογραφία) προκειμένου να συνεχίσει ακάθεκτη η περίφημη «ανάπτυξη» κατά την εποχή της «παγκοσμιοποιήσεως».

Βέβαια όλα τα προηγούμενα δεν τα ήθελε «η Ευρώπη», έτσι γενικά και αόριστα, αλλά τα είχε ανάγκη το «φιλελεύθερο» κράτος της «αναπτύξεως», προκειμένου να συνεχίσει να υφίσταται και να υπερβεί το λεγόμενο «φιλελεύθερο παράδοξο» (*) στο οποίο βρίσκονται παγιδευμένα τα -«φιλελεύθερα αναπτυξιακά»- κράτη. Εξ ου και αποτέλεσε απαραίτητη συνθήκη ο λεγόμενος μουλτικουλτουραλισμός («πολυπολιτισμός»), ο οποίος βρίσκεται σε υποχώρηση (**).

Στην πορεία, βέβαια, εδημιουργήθησαν ορισμένα «προβλήματα» καθώς οι άνθρωποι δεν είναι απλά «συντελεστές» (π.χ. εργασία) αλλά κουβαλούν μαζί τους ιδέες, νοοτροπίες, ηθικές στάσεις και διάφορα άλλα περίεργα και περιττά -για «την παραγωγή»- πράγματα. Εξ ου και αποτελεί απαραίτητη συνθήκη ο «εξευρωπαϊσμός» τους προκειμένου να προσανατολισθούν αποκλειστικά στην «παραγωγή».

Για να επιτευχθεί ο προσανατολισμός και η ενσωμάτωση στην «παραγωγή» πρέπει η «εργασία», δηλαδή οι άνθρωποι, να κλεισθούν αεροστεγώς σε ένα ιδεολογικό οικοδόμημα από το οποίο δεν επιτρέπεται καμία διαρροή. Το ιδεολογικό αυτό οικοδόμημα τιτλοφορείται συνήθως υπό συνθήματα όπως «εξευρωπαϊσμός» ή/και «δυτικές αξίες» (συνθήματα που μικρή σχέση έχουν με την πραγματική ιστορική εξέλιξη των λαών, των κοινωνιών και των εθνών της ευρωπαϊκής ηπείρου). Κάπως έτσι θέλησαν ορισμένοι τα πράγματα. Τα πράγματα όμως ήρθαν αλλιώς.

-----
(*) Στο λεγόμενο «φιλελεύθερο παράδοξο» έχω αναφερθεί παλαιότερα επιγραμματικά. Σκοπεύω να αναφερθώ αναλυτικά μελλοντικά.

(**) Μια οπισθοχώρηση η οποία έχει αποκτήσει επίσημη θεσμική ευρωενωσιακή έκφραση εδώ και κάποια χρόνια -και όχι μονάχα τους τελευταίους μήνες-, για την οποία ουδείς ομιλεί και στην οποία, επίσης, θα αναφερθώ μελλοντικά.

20 Δεκεμβρίου 2015

A New Century for the Middle East.

Ενδιαφέρον θα είχε αυτό το κείμενο να μεταφραστεί στην ελληνική. Δεν γράφει κάτι το ιδιαίτερο, αυτονόητα -μη ανιστόρητα- πράγματα διαβάζουμε. Η άξια του έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι το έγραψε ένας άνθρωπος ο οποίος κατά καιρούς έχει παρουσιαστεί ως ένθερμος παρεμβατιστής (interventionist). Δεν είναι ανάγκη να συμφωνεί κάποιος συνολικά με την προσέγγιση του.



NEW YORK – The United States, the European Union, and Western-led institutions such as the World Bank repeatedly ask why the Middle East can’t govern itself. The question is asked honestly but without much self-awareness. After all, the single most important impediment to good governance in the region has been its lack of self-governance: The region’s political institutions have been crippled as a result of repeated US and European intervention dating back to World War I, and in some places even earlier.

One century is enough. The year 2016 should mark the start of a new century of homegrown Middle Eastern politics focused urgently on the challenges of sustainable development.

The Middle East’s fate during the last 100 years was cast in November 1914, when the Ottoman Empire chose the losing side in World War I. The result was the empire’s dismantling, with the victorious powers, Britain and France, grabbing hegemonic control over its remnants. Britain, already in control of Egypt since 1882, took effective control of governments in today’s Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, while France, already in control of much of North Africa, took control of Lebanon and Syria.

Formal League of Nations mandates and other instruments of hegemony were exercised to ensure British and French power over oil, ports, shipping lanes, and local leaders’ foreign policies. In what would become Saudi Arabia, Britain backed the Wahhabi fundamentalism of Ibn Saud over the Arab nationalism of the Hashemite Hejaz.

After World War II, the US picked up the interventionist mantle, following a CIA-backed military coup in Syria in 1949 with another CIA operation to topple Iran’s Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 (to keep the West in control of the country’s oil). The same behavior has continued up to the present day: the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011, the toppling of Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi in 2013, and the ongoing war against Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. For almost seven decades, the US and its allies have repeatedly intervened (or supported internally-led coups) to oust governments that were not sufficiently under their thumb.

The West also armed the entire region through hundreds of billions of dollars in weapons sales. The US established military bases throughout the region, and repeated failed operations by the CIA have left massive supplies of armaments in the hands of violent foes of the US and Europe.

So, when Western leaders ask Arabs and others in the region why they can’t govern themselves, they should be prepared for the answer:

“For a full century, your interventions have undermined democratic institutions (by rejecting the results of the ballot box in Algeria, Palestine, Egypt, and elsewhere); stoked repeated and now chronic wars; armed the most violent jihadists for your cynical bidding; and created a killing field that today stretches from Bamako to Kabul.”


What, then, should be done to bring about a new Middle East? I would propose five principles.

First, and most important, the US should end covert CIA operations aimed at toppling or destabilizing governments anywhere in the world. The CIA was created in 1947 with two mandates, one valid (intelligence gathering) and the other disastrous (covert operations to overthrow regimes deemed “hostile” to US interests). The US president can and should, by executive order, terminate CIA covert operations – and thereby end the legacy of blowback and mayhem that they have sustained, most notably in the Middle East.

Second, the US should pursue its sometimes-valid foreign-policy objectives in the region through the United Nations Security Council. The current approach of building US-led “coalitions of the willing” has not only failed; it has also meant that even valid US objectives such as stopping the Islamic State are blocked by geopolitical rivalries.

The US would gain much by putting its foreign-policy initiatives to the test of Security Council votes. When the Security Council rejected war in Iraq in 2003, the US would have been wise to abstain from invading. When Russia, a veto-wielding permanent member of the Council, opposed the US-backed overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the US would have been wise to abstain from covert operations to topple him. And now, the entire Security Council would coalesce around a global (but not a US) plan to fight the Islamic State.

Third, the US and Europe should accept the reality that democracy in the Middle East will produce many Islamist victories at the ballot box. Many of the elected Islamist regimes will fail, as many poorly performing governments do. They will be overturned at the next ballot, or in the streets, or even by local generals. But the repeated efforts of Britain, France, and the US to keep all Islamist governments out of power only block political maturation in the region, without actually succeeding or providing long-term benefits.

Fourth, homegrown leaders from the Sahel through North Africa and the Middle East to Central Asia should recognize that the most important challenge facing the Islamic world today is the quality of education. The region lags far behind its middle-income counterparts in science, math, technology innovation, entrepreneurship, small business development, and (therefore) job creation. Without high-quality education, there is little prospect for economic prosperity and political stability anywhere.

Finally, the region should address its exceptional vulnerability to environmental degradation and its overdependence on hydrocarbons, especially in view of the global shift to low-carbon energy. The Muslim-majority region from West Africa to Central Asia is the world’s largest populous dry region, a 5,000-mile (8,000 kilometers) swath of water stress, desertification, rising temperatures, and food insecurity.

These are the true challenges facing the Middle East. The Sunni-Shia divide, Assad’s political future, and doctrinal disputes are of decidedly lesser long-term importance to the region than the unmet need for quality education, job skills, advanced technologies, and sustainable development. The many brave and progressive thinkers in the Islamic world should help to awaken their societies to this reality, and people of goodwill around the world should help them to do it through peaceful cooperation and the end of imperial-style wars and manipulation.

Jeffrey D. Sachs

Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Sustainable Development, Professor of Health Policy and Management, and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is also Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Millennium Development Goals. His books include The End of Poverty, Common Wealth, and, most recently, The Age of Sustainable Development. Read more at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/middle-east-sustaining-development-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2015-12#24i2hiDxR8DdLeWD.99

Τρεις σύντομοι σχολιασμοί (20 Δεκ 2015).

I
Κοινωνίες που δεν μπορούν να αναπαραχθούν και πιστεύουν πως θα ''τις σώσει'' «η τεχνολογία και η οικονομία» ή/και «η μετανάστευση», είναι φανερό πως είτε έχουν πέσει θύμα μιας προπαγάνδας που κινείται μεταξύ οικονομισμού, τεχνολογικού μεσσιανισμού και ευσεβών πόθων, είτε έχει κατισχύσει σε αυτές ένα πνεύμα ανορθολογισμού και λαϊκισμού που τις οδηγεί σε ολοκληρωτική έλλειψη προσανατολισμού. Αυτές αποτελούν -ψευδοελιτίστικου- φαραωνικού τύπου σκέψεις.


II
Μέρος της ελληνικής κοινωνίας, εκείνο που διατηρεί ακόμα χαρακτηριστικά δήμου και συνείδηση πολίτη, έχει καταλάβει πως σήμερα στην Ελλάδα δεν υπάρχει -αυτό που ονομάζουμε- δημοκρατική αντιπροσώπευση. Άνθρωποι που δεν το συνειδητοποιούν είναι είτε εγκλωβισμένοι είτε καθεστωτικοί.

Η λογική του μικρότερου κακού και το πείραμα του βατράχου που σιγοβράζει στη χύτρα έχει κάνει καλή δουλειά. Πολλοί από εμάς δεν έχουν συνειδητοποιήσει, δεν έχουν ολοκληρωμένη αντίληψη τι ακριβώς έχει συμβεί τη τελευταία -περίπου- δεκαετία. Τι έχουν ανεχτεί. Είναι υπερβολικά ανεκτικοί προς τους κυβερνώντες. Δεν είναι η έλλειψη ανεκτικότητας, αλλά η υπερβολική ανοχή απέναντι στο πολιτικό σύστημα και σε φαινόμενα παρακμής που μας έφερε σε αυτό το σημείο.

Στην Ελλάδα δεν υπάρχει δημοκρατική ανάδειξη αντιπροσώπων. Καταργήθηκε η δημοκρατική εξέλιξη και διαλεκτική που οδηγεί στην ανάδειξη σοβαρών αντιπολιτευτικών και εναλλακτικών πόλων. Καταργήθηκε η αντιπροσώπευση, ο διάλογος, οι ιδέες. Οδηγηθήκαμε σε μια ελεγχόμενη και μπλοκαριμένη «δημοκρατία» όπου κυριάρχησαν άνθρωποι που αντί να θέσουν σε λειτουργία την Ελλάδα ως σύστημα, πολιτικό, οικονομικό, πολιτιστικό, ιστορικό, ηθικό, την αποδιάρθρωσαν.

Στην Ελλάδα δεν υπάρχει ανάδειξη των φυσικών, ιστορικών ηγεσιών της χώρας. Υπάρχει ένα είδος επετηρίδας που επιβάλλεται από εξωθεσμικά και παραθεσμικά κέντρα και εξωεθνικούς παράγοντες.


III
Άνθρωποι χυδαίοι και γλοιώδεις που διεξάγουν εδώ και χρόνια ασύμμετρο πολιτιστικό και ψυχολογικό πόλεμο και ανελέητη προπαγάνδα στο εσωτερικό της χώρας, ζαλίζοντας μας με μια -ανύπαρκτη ιστορικά- εξιδανικευμένη θεότητα με το όνομα «Ευρώπη» (απέναντι στην οποία πρέπει να νιώθουμε μειονεξία προκειμένου να κάτσουμε φρόνιμα, να ανεχτούμε και να υποστούμε τα πάντα) φαίνεται πως σταδιακά ξυπνούν συνοφρυωμένοι και ξαφνιασμένοι από το ρόδινο όνειρο αυτής της εξιδανίκευσης. Βρίσκονται βέβαια ακόμα σε κατάσταση άρνησης και εθελοτυφλούν αναφωνώντας «δεν είναι δυνατόν, αυτά δεν είναι Ευρώπη!». Είναι και παρά είναι. Απολαύστε τώρα υπαρκτή «Ευρώπη» και ηρεμήστε. Όποιος έχει μελετήσει στοιχειωδώς ευρωπαϊκή ιστορία, γνωρίζει πως πολλά φαινόμενα δεν είναι ούτε περιθωριακά, ούτε αποτελούν οπισθοδρομήσεις ή αναδιπλώσεις στην ιστορική πορεία της πιο αιματοβαμμένης ηπείρου στον πλανήτη.

12 Νοεμβρίου 2015

The American Tributary System.

The American Tributary System
by Yuen Foong Khong
Oxford Journals
© The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Oxford Journals. The Chinese Journal of International Politics aims to advance the systematic and rigorous study of international relations. Besides the papers based on modern methodology, this journal also publishes research products of historical studies and policy-oriented research. This journal is committed to providing a forum for academic papers and articles on problematic issues. Most of its articles are either related to China or have implication for Chinese foreign policy.


.~`~.
Abstract

This article employs the idea of the tributary system—most often associated with China’s international relations from antiquity—to interpret how America relates to the rest of the world. I argue that the United States has instituted the most successful tributary system the world has ever seen. As the hub or epicenter of the most extensive network of formal and informal alliances ever built, the United States offers its allies and partners—or tributaries—military protection as well as economic access to its markets. In return for all its exertions, the tribute America seeks is straightforward: first, that it be recognized as the power or hegemon, and second, that others emulate its political forms and ideas. With both tributes in hand, the United States finds equanimity; it and the world are safe, at least from the United States’ point of view.

America has more in common with China than is generally recognized. In this article, I employ the idea of the tributary system—most often associated with China’s international relations from antiquity—to interpret how America relates to the rest of the world (ROW). I argue that the United States has instituted the most successful tributary system the world has ever seen. As the hub or epicenter of the most extensive network of formal and informal alliances ever built, the United States offers its allies and partners—or tributaries—military protection as well as economic access to its markets.1 Through an equally impressive array of international institutions and organizations, many of which it created, the United States transmits and imposes its values and its preferred rules of the game on the international system. The ensuing economic and politico-military ‘orders’ are construed as ‘public goods’ provided by a benign American hegemony. In return for all its exertions, the tribute America seeks is straightforward: first, that it be recognized as the power or hegemon, and second, that others emulate its political forms and ideas. With both tributes in hand, the United States finds equanimity; it and the world are safe, at least from the United States’ point of view.

I elaborate on these arguments below and provide preliminary evidence in support of them. We begin with a discussion and critique of some of the most influential contemporary interpretations of America as an international actor, focusing on accounts of the US empire, the United States as the unipolar power, and as the chief patron of a system of client states. I suggest that while these accounts illuminate important aspects of the US–ROW relationship, they fail to emphasize the payback the United States wants in return for its exertions as the hegemon. This paves the way for introducing the idea of the tributary system, which takes hierarchy as its point of departure, but which emphasizes two insights not found in the existing accounts: the United States’ desire for recognition (by its tributaries) that it is the number one power, and for them (the tributaries) to adopt (US-style) liberal democratic norms and institutions. A discussion of the Chinese tributary system follows, focusing on six of its key characteristics. I then demonstrate how each of these features has parallels in America’s approach to world since 1898. Differences between the Chinese tributary system and that of the United States will also be discussed. The article concludes by spelling out the empirical/theoretical payoffs and implications of viewing US–ROW relations through the tributary lens.


.~`~.
Characterizing America

City upon a hill, the first new nation, promised land, special providence, indispensable nation:2 these are some of the time-honored and contemporary conceptualizations of how America relates to the ROW. The common theme is difference: how America, by virtue of its history, ideology, and geography is different from all other nations. From George Washington’s warning about not following the Europeans in getting entangled in alliances, to John Quincy Adam’s adage about not looking for external dragons to slay, the United States in its early history portrayed itself as disdainful of the power politics that characterized Europe. For Walter MacDougall, the United States was a ‘promised land’ from its founding in 1776, to 1898; thereafter, it fell from grace as its growing power transformed it into a ‘crusader state’ for much of the 20th century.3

Consistent with MacDougall’s portrayal of the United States as betraying its promise, long range interpretations of the United States during the Cold War tended to be critical. George Kennan’s American Diplomacy was perhaps the most prominent and problematic.4 Delivered as a lecture series at the University of Chicago, the author of the famous X-article took his readers through six key episodes of American diplomacy, from the Spanish American War to World War II, in search of the fundamental drivers of US foreign policy. He found it in the legalistic–moralistic approach of the United States to foreign policy, which he assessed as lamentable and dangerous. For Kennan, as for all realists, national interest, not legalism–moralism, should drive policy. Kennan worried that a policy driven by the latter would endanger America’s security in the age of rivalry with the Soviets.

But he need not have worried: the general consensus is that legalism–moralism took a back seat to realpolitik in shaping America’s conduct during the Cold War. The Soviet, and later Chinese, threat concentrated American minds, and prompted it to respond to numerous perceived challenges to its power position, from Korea to Vietnam to Nicaragua to Angola. Concerns about the prestige and credibility of American power and looking to history to learn about the consequences of not exercising power in time trumped legalistic–moralistic thinking so much so that later editions of American Diplomacy had Kennan wondering if the United States should have traded some realpolitik national interest thinking for a bit more of legalism–moralism. During the Cold War, however, such long range interpretations gave way to more traditional diplomatic histories and cases-based studies by political scientists interested in building and testing theories.

As the Cold War came to an end, long-range interpretations of the United States returned in force. The demise of the Soviet Union meant that the United States became the sole superpower, or the unipolar power. Was it a unipolar moment or was it something more enduring? William Wohlforth probably had the better of the argument when he wrote that US unipolarity would last a generation, challengers would hesitate to take the United States on, and consequently, a stable order would ensue.5 While international relations scholars debated when and if unipolarity would give way to multipolarity, and whether ‘soft balancing’ against the United States was already in train,6 a different cluster of writings, anchored around the notion of an US empire emerged.

This was evident even before the September 11 attacks, but after the attacks, with the United States invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, characterizations of the empire impetus increased exponentially. The notion of an American empire is especially intriguing for the purposes of this article for three reasons. One, the empire idea has spawned a voluminous literature, suggesting that historians and political scientists see it as an apt description of the United States.7 Two, it is also theoretically richer than most other characterizations in that inherent in the concept are a variety of hypotheses about the motivations and forms of American foreign policy.8 Finally, it also bears the closest resemblance to my characterization of America as the hub of a tributary system; it is thus necessary to spell out their differences as well as to suggest in what sense, if any, the tributary characterization gives us more analytic traction than that provided by ‘empire’.

Narratives of the American empire often begin with the westward expansion of the New England colonies, the depredations against the native Americans, and the wars against Mexico that annexed Texas, New Mexico, and California, to the United States. Securing the continental land mass was a pre-requisite for turning America’s gaze outwards. As America came of age as a world power, overtaking Great Britain at the turn of century, it also began to acquire lands beyond its own continent. Like Britain and France during their heydays, the United States, beginning with the Spanish–American War, began acquiring colonies and over time, an empire. The United States entered World War II to prevent German hegemony over the European continent and Japanese hegemony over East Asia; success meant that the United States became the hegemon in both Western Europe and East Asia. Between 1945 and 1991, it had to confront the Soviet Union, but the superiority of US political ideas, economics, technology, and culture (soft power) allowed it to outplay and outlast the Soviets. Aided by willing acolytes who provide it with hundreds of bases worldwide to project its power, the United States sits at the apex of a system of states more responsive to its will than that of most others most of the time. There is a case for the United States as the ‘New Rome’.9

Yet the empire lens faces several challenges. First, the notion of ‘empire’—conjuring up images of Rome, Great Britain, and France—is fundamentally at odds with America’s sense of self. Peter Katzenstein puts it well: ‘Most Americans believe that the United States, by its history and very nature, cannot be imperial, let alone imperialist.’10 Without batting an eye, Katzenstein proceeds to advance his argument about the ‘American imperium’, in Europe and Asia.11 But the contrasts between the empire/imperium and the ‘City upon a Hill’ constructs are too stark for the former to be accepted by most Americans. That is why US officials almost never utter the ‘E’ world in public. Historians and political scientists who see some utility in the concept have also seen fit to qualify the ‘E’ word by adding adjectives before or after as in ‘inadvertent empire’, ‘empire by invitation’ or ‘empire lite’.12 These qualifications accentuate the acceptability and benignness of the American empire: unlike previous empires, subjects of the US ‘invited’ or consented to US domination. Or the United States stumbled into acquiring an empire and runs it with a ‘lite’ touch. From the Spanish–American war forward, the way the United States acquired and annexed territories or tried to stop others from doing so do not seem that ‘lite’ or ‘inadvertent’ to those at the receiving end. The question that arises is whether the guts of what it means to be an empire have been expunged by such qualifications.

A novel variant of the empire thesis is David Sylvan and Donald Majeski’s recent contribution viewing America’s relations with the ROW through a patron–client lens.13 What is new about their interpretation is they focus on the instruments accumulated by the United States over time; these instruments, they argue, became a decisive force in shaping US policies. Equally interesting is their categorization of much of the world into clients and nonclients of the United States, which we will later adopt as proxy indicators for US tributaries and nontributaries. Where I differ from Sylvan and Majeski is that in focusing on the instruments, they seem to lose sight of how and why the United States acquired those instruments of power. For them, ‘what is distinct about 1898 is the relative paucity of policy instruments … . Policymakers had few ready-to-had responses for dealing with those problems …’ However, ‘[by] the 1940s and even more so by the 1990s, the situation was radically different … .The United States then had a set of developed policy instruments which had become the standard way of interacting with … .’.14

This focus on policy instruments begs the question of what was responsible for the advent and expansion of those policy instruments? The answer is of course the growth of American power. The cut off dates for Sylvan and Majeski are revealing. The year of the Spanish-American war, 1898, is seen by historians as the year signaling the United States’s coming of age as a great power. The early 1940s is when it becomes clear that it has overtaken Britain as the hegemon (in Europe), for without its intervention in World War II, Western Europe might have fallen to Hitler. The 1990s is of course when the United States inherits its unipolar position. In other words, Sylvan and Majeski are right to point to the development and availability of policy instruments, but what needs to be emphasized, in my view, is the growth of US power that made the acquisition of those policy instruments possible.15

The empire and patron–client concepts, however, contain the seeds of a new and potentially fruitful idea: the United States as the hub or epicenter of a tributary system analogous to that of China’s during the Ming and Qing dynasties. No author writing in the above or other genres has argued for the relevance of the (Chinese) tributary system as a possible framework for understanding how America relates to the ROW.16 Neither has any of the new and important works on the Chinese tributary system (many published by this journal) made the link between the latter and American foreign policy.17 That will be the purpose of this article...

These considerations argue in favor of our adopting their list of US ‘clients’ as a proxy for US tributaries and their list of ‘US nonclients’ as a proxy for nontributaries. There is the risk that transposing the concepts this way may involve some loss of precision for the tributary concept, but for the present purpose, that is more than offset by the gains of relying on quality data not specifically generated for the tributary thesis. Going by their data, 40% of the world fall into the US ‘clients’—or tributaries—category.22 The breakdown of US ‘clients’ or ‘tributaries’ for the various regions of the world in 2005 are: Western hemisphere (97%), Middle East/North Africa (55%), Europe (43%), East Asia/Oceania (43%), Caucasus, Central and South Asia (13%), and Africa (7%).23


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The Chinese Tributary System

The Chinese tributary system is usually construed as a means of organizing and regulating China’s external relations from antiquity to the 19th century. It was a system that, according to John Fairbank, ‘handled the interstate relations of a large part of mankind throughout most of recorded history’.24 Generally seen to have reached its apogee from the 14th to the 19th centuries (the Ming and Qing dynasties), the system structured China’s cultural, economic, and security relations with both its neighbors in East Asia and countries from afar. In his recent study of the Chinese tributary system and its impact on East Asia’s international order, David Kang provides a succinct and historically sensitive elaboration of what the system was about:

[T]he tribute system was a set of institutional structures that provided an overarching framework for organizing external relations among political actors in early modern East Asia. A set of rules and institutions developed over time that regulated foreign diplomatic relations, social and economic interaction, and provided a clear sense of order to the system.25

For the purposes of analysis, it is useful to disaggregate the ideas, institutional structures, and rules that constitute the tribute system into the following six features.

Sinocentrism and Civilizational Greatness

Hierarchy, Inequality, and Hegemony

Concentric Radiation

Rituals and Tribute

A Benevolent and Noncoercive Hub

The Domestic is the International and Vice Versa

...What was the impact of the tributary system on the international relations of East Asia? David Kang has argued that it brought China and the region four centuries of inter-state peace and stability.44 All six elements had a role in engendering that peace. Most in East Asia accepted, or at least did not contest China’s civilizational greatness. The Sinicized states voluntarily gave China what it wanted—acknowledgement of its hegemonic status and recognition of its civilization-based superiority. For China, that was in large part what the tributary missions, kowtowing, and investiture ceremonies were about. For the secondary states, it was that and more: they also got protection and commerce. In the main, they also bought into the ideational system and this can be seen in the way that they sought to replicate the tributary model among themselves and in their idealizations of what the model ruler/bureaucrat did. They were not, as David Kang put it, smirking behind China’s back. They internalized the Confucian values and sought to replicate them in their dealings with one another.45

With the principles and effects of the Chinese tributary system laid out, it is now possible to ask: do they have their parallels in America’s approach to the ROW? The task here is not to find exact parallels—an oxymoron and impossible task at any rate—but to discover plausible analogs in US diplomacy that resemble the elements and workings of the Chinese tributary system. Analogical reasoning does not prove; it functions best as a heuristic device for discovering new observations or hypotheses.46 For example, using the Chinese tributary analogy as a lens to examine US diplomacy allows us to ask, what might be the analog (in America) for the Sinocentrism/civilizational greatness assumption? Hypotheses we come up with can and should be assessed against the historical and contemporary experience of American diplomacy.

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Table 1 presents, in a summary form, the US analog to each of the above features of the Chinese tributary system. The next section elaborates on each of these analogs.

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American Exceptionalism and National Greatness

The American analog of Sinocentrism is an idea well known to students of American government and foreign policy: the idea of American exceptionalism.47 From John Winthrop’s ‘city upon a hill’ to Magdalene Albright’s ‘standing taller, seeing further’, America’s sense of self has revolved around its being special and distinct, especially on the moral and political–ideological fronts.48 Whereas China saw itself as the Middle Kingdom—a center of the universe conceit, the United States sees itself as the city on the hill—a sitting at the pinnacle of the world conceit. Like China, the basis of the US difference was moral distance from the ‘other’. The New World’s ‘other’ was the Old World, Europe, rife with inequality, autocratic rule, warfare, and balance of power politics. And if the ideological basis of China’s moral rectitude was Confucianism, then that of the United States was liberal democracy, with a focus on individual liberty or freedom. Heavenly interjection was also central to both of their political identities. While the Chinese emperor ruled ‘all under heaven’ (tianxia) as the metaphorical Son of Heaven, Americans saw their land and themselves as being blessed by God and Special Providence. As President Andrew Jackson put it, ‘Providence has showered on this favored land blessings without number and has chosen you as the guardians of freedom, to preserve it for the benefit of the human race.’.

Difference alone, however, does not qualify one for occupying center stage or hub status in the hierarchy of nations. Greatness is also essential. China’s claim to greatness and to being the epicenter to which tribute must be paid was based on the discourse about the superiority of its civilization. Does the United States also have a notion of greatness, and if so, what is it premised on? Michael Hunt has argued that a vision of national greatness constituted one of three major strands of US ideology by the turn of the 20th century.50 That vision was premised on protecting and promoting liberty via an assertive foreign policy.

While some initially worried that the pursuit of national greatness might strengthen the executive to the point of threatening liberty within America, those who argued the reverse—that a policy of national greatness would actually enhance liberty within—won the debate by the late 1880s. By then the United States had become a great power. Not surprisingly, visions of national greatness captured the popular imagination and welding those visions to protecting and projecting liberty seemed natural. Josiah Strong, the evangelist, summarized the zeitgeist of the times well when he argued that God was ‘preparing mankind to receive our impress’.51 As the remarks of John Winthrop and Andrew Jackson’s suggest, no great mental leap is needed in moving from the ‘city on the hill’ to ‘national greatness’—all one needs is a rationale or justification connecting the two, and the United States found it in the idea of liberty. American elites conjured up a view about the intimate and mutually reinforcing relationship between liberty at home and liberty abroad. Hunt describes this mindset eloquently:

A policy devoted to both liberty and greatness … . was far from being a dangerous and unstable union of incompatibles. Instead, greatness abroad would glorify liberty at home. … Secure in their faith in liberty, Americans would set about remaking others in their own image while the world watched on awe.52

Pursuing national greatness, supporting liberty abroad to protect it at home, and remaking others in America’s image remain consistent and enduring themes in US diplomacy, as anyone familiar with US foreign policy, the speech-acts of US leaders, and the writings of US analysts will attest. From Woodrow Wilson’s fighting World War I to ‘make the world safe for democracy’, to the makeover of Germany and Japan into democracies after World War II, to winning the Cold War and becoming the unipolar power, to the Clinton administration’s (and before that Reagan and Carter's) efforts at promoting and enlarging democracies, it is clear that the United States acted on these imperatives when it could.53 There are of course competing imperatives such as strategic necessity (Bahrain during the Arab Spring), economic renewal (in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008), or world public opinion (in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq) that complicate and hold back supporting liberty and pursuing greatness, but they do not detract from their overall importance as major strands of US foreign policy.

Hierarchy, Inequality, and US Leadership

...Unipolarity and hegemony, however, are not the favored descriptions of America for policymakers in the United States and its tributaries. Unipolarity sounds too social scientific and soulless while hegemony smacks of domination.62 Their preferred discourse is one of US leadership. Figure 1, an N-gram of the terms ‘US, Soviet, and British world leadership’, shows that the United States is associated most consistently, since the 1940s, with world leadership. It shows that the phrase ‘U.S. world leadership’ began appearing in books (written in English) in the early 1940s, with its usage showing a strong and consistent upward trajectory from the late 1970s. Britain makes an appearance from the 1930s to 1950s, but thereafter pales in comparison with the United States. The N-gram finds virtually no works in the English language associating world leadership with the Soviet Union. To be sure, most of these works are probably written by Americans, but one would also expect them to include authors from other English-speaking countries who generally buy into ‘the need for American leadership’ perspective.

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Fig. 1 Ngram of US, Soviet, and British World Leadership


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In the post-Cold War era, both official discourse and policy sustained this conception of American leadership. Officials talk about US leadership, academics write approvingly of it, and Pentagon plans call for preventing other powers—friendly or unfriendly—from challenging the United States in the key regions of the world (Europe, Persian Gulf, and Asia).63 When the US conception of the ‘New World Order’ was challenged by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States felt it necessary to go to war to beat back Iraq’s aggression against its tiny but rich neighbor.
Democracy as the Sincerest Form of Flattery

There are two hierarchies in the Chinese tributary system. First, there is China, sitting at the apex of the system. Second, among the tributaries, those most similar culturally to China are ranked higher (and receive more perks) than those less similar. In the American case, the United States of course occupies the pole position. But are the secondary states ranked? They undoubtedly are. As Table 2 suggests, those who make it to the top echelons or inner circles of the American system are overwhelmingly liberal democracies.

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Table 2 America’s Closest Tributariesa


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Closeness or proximity to the United States is measured by 15 indicators developed for the purposes of this article. The indicators are: participation in America’s wars since 1945, hosting US troops and/or bases on one’s territory, opportunities to address joint Houses of the United States Congress, how favorable and/or great a friend the tributary is according to US public opinion, visa waiver status, signing of Free Trade Agreements with the United States, formal military allies since 1945, Major Non-NATO Ally status (MNNA), OECD membership, and major partners in intelligence sharing. Appendix Table A1 shows how US tributaries and nontributaries score on each of the indicators; Appendix Table A2 provides brief descriptions of the indicators and identifies the sources used for each of them. Space limitations prevent us from delving into and elaborating on each of these ‘measures’ of proximity to the United States, but most of the measures should not be controversial. Countries are given one point for each indicator in which they feature (e.g. South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War garners it one point), with 15 points being the maximum.

The results are in basic accord with our intuitive sense of who America’s closest allies and friends are. South Korea, Australia, and Britain emerge as the United States’ closest allies or tributaries (band 1); South Korea ticks 14 of the 15 boxes, compared with 12 each for Australia and Britain. Canada and France occupy band 2 while Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain are to be found in band 3. In band 4 are Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey.

One should not make too much of the exact band that any particular ally or tributary is in. Some may argue that Japan and Israel deserve to be a band or two higher and with a different set of indicators, that may well be true. Even if that were the case, it should not change the central message of Table 2: America’s closest tributaries (bands 1–4) are, without exception, democracies. However one juggles the relative rankings of countries in the first four bands, the result is the same: fellow democracies make the best tributaries. In the lower bands (5 and 6), nondemocratic tributaries do show up, but they are in the minority.

The overall pattern is clear: the odds are strongly against nondemocracies being admitted to the highest ranks of the US tributary system. In that sense, both the Chinese and American tributary systems are very similar in possessing a ranking system of the secondary states. In the former, the basis for being admitted into the inner zone was proximity to Chinese civilization; in the latter, the criterion for joining the inner circle is adherence to liberal democratic norms and practices.66


Benevolence for Tributaries, Malevolence toward Challengers

The Domestic-International Nexus: Free World Leadership

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US–China Differences

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The Self-Perceptions and Behaviors of the Tributaries

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Conclusion



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Appendix

White indicate US Tributary State.

Grey highlights indicate US Non Ttibutary State.


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Κείμενα για τις Η.Π.Α - Κείμενα για την Κίνα

8 Νοεμβρίου 2015

Η κορύφωση μιας ιστορικής περιόδου.

Ζούμε την κορύφωση μιας ιστορικής πορείας υποχώρησης, συρρίκνωσης ή/και παρακμής, η οποία ξεκινά μετά το 1922. Η πορεία αυτή θα ολοκληρωθεί με το Κυπριακό και το Μακεδονικό [*], τα ζητήματα της Θράκης και του Αιγαίου (και προφανώς της Ηπείρου). Παραθέτω απόσπασμα από ένα γνωστό κείμενο και ολοκληρώνω με ένα σχολιασμό:

...το γεωπολιτικό δυναμικό της ελληνικής πλευράς αποτυπωνόταν κατά τον 19ο αι., και ίσαμε το σημαδιακό έτος 1922, πολύ περισσότερο στο έθνος παρά στο κράτος. Το έθνος ήταν κατά πολύ ευρύτερο από το κράτος, απλωνόταν από την Ουκρανία ως την Αίγυπτο κι από τις παρακαυκάσιες χώρες ως τις ακμαίες παροικίες των Βαλκανίων και της κεντρικής και δυτικής Ευρώπης...

Έκτοτε [μετά την κορύφωση του 1920] αρχίζει η αντίστροφη μέτρηση, που διαρκεί ως σήμερα.

Το έθνος συνέπεσε εν τέλει με το κράτος όχι γιατί το κράτος διευρύνθηκε, αλλά γιατί το έθνος ακρωτηριάσθηκε καί συρρικνώθηκε, γιατί αφανίσθηκε ή εκτοπίσθηκε ο ελληνισμός της Ρωσσίας (μετά το 1919), της Μ. Ασίας (μετά το 1922), των Βαλκανίων καί της Μέσης Ανατολής (ιδίως μετά το 1945). Ακολούθησε η εκδίωξη του ελληνισμού από την Κωνσταντινούπολη (1955) καί την βόρειο Κύπρο (1974), ενώ σήμερα παρευρισκόμαστε μάρτυρες της αποσύνθεσης καί της μαζικής φυγής του ελληνισμού της Βορείου Ηπείρου. Πρόκειται για μιαν εξαιρετικά πυκνή αλυσίδα εθνικών καταστροφών μέσα σε διάστημα ελάχιστο από ιστορική άποψη - εβδομήντα μόλις χρόνια. Και οι καταστροφές αυτές δεν επιδέχονται, αναπλήρωση ή αντιστάθμιση...

Ας κλείσουμε αυτή την άκρως συνοπτική ανασκόπηση με τη θλιβερότερη ίσως διαπίστωση. Το ελληνικό κράτος δεν στάθηκε σε καμμία φάση ικανό να προστατεύσει αποτελεσματικά τον ευρύτερο ελληνισμό και να αναστείλει τη συρρίκνωση η τον αφανισμό του. Απεναντίας μάλιστα, το 1974 την καταστροφή την προκάλεσε, άμεσα τουλάχιστον, η ολέθρια πραξικοπηματική ενέργεια που προήλθε από τη μητροπολιτική Ελλάδα. Και αν αυτά τα έκαμαν οι δικτάτορες, οι κοινοβουλευτικές κυβερνήσεις σίγουρα δεν έχουν λόγους να είναι υπερήφανες για τη χλιαρή έως ανύπαρκτη αντίδραση τους απέναντι στον ξερριζωμό των Ελλήνων της Κωνσταντινούπολης, της Ιμβρου και της Τενέδου.

Η αποδεδειγμένη ανικανότητα του ελληνικού κράτους να υπερασπίσει το ελληνικό έθνος - δηλαδή να επιτελέσει την κατ' εξοχήν αποστολή του - συνιστά τον ανησυχητικότερο οιωνό για το μέλλον. Γιατί ήδη το ελληνικό κράτος βαθμηδόν φανερώνεται ανήμπορο να προστατεύσει ακόμα και το έθνος που βρίσκεται εντός των συνόρων του.

Πράγματι. Από τότε που έγραψε το προηγούμενο απόσπασμα ο Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης (εκδοθέν το 1997) είχαμε την επιβεβαίωση της αδυναμίας του κράτους να προστατεύσει το έθνος που βρίσκεται εντός των συνόρων του, με την κατ' εξακολούθηση υποχώρηση του και τις συνεχείς εκχωρήσεις κυριαρχίας το 1997, το 1999, το 2010 και το 2011 και την πρόσφατη μαζική φυγή του πληθυσμού (το «ελληνικό κράτος» μας έχει ''τιμήσει'' και στο παρελθόν -κάνοντας τη δουλειά του- διώχνοντας μας μαζικά: μεταπολεμικά, μεταξύ 1946 και 1977, υπολογίζεται πως περίπου 1.000.000 Έλληνες έφυγαν από τη χώρα. Στις μέρες μας, σε λιγότερο από μια δεκαετία, έχουν φύγει πάνω από μισό εκατομμύριο). Για να καταλήξουμε το 2015 να αποδομούνται και να κατακερματίζονται, one by one, τα συστατικά μέρη ακόμα και της εσωτερικής πλέον κυριαρχίας, όπως αυτή του κοινοβούλιου, η νομοθετική κυριαρχία, η εδαφική, του προϋπολογισμού, να αμφισβητείται ευθέως η ναυτική και γενικότερα πολιτική και οικονομική κυριαρχία (τα προηγούμενα αποτελούν προϋπόθεση προκειμένου κατακερματιστεί και να εκποιηθεί μια κοινωνία). Αυτή είναι η ουσιαστική πορεία από το 2009-2011 και μετά, περίοδος η οποία αποτελεί την κορύφωση μιας πορείας που ξεκινά από το 1922.

Από το 1922 έως το 2015 -παρά τις περί του αντιθέτου μυθολογικές ερμηνείες- η πορεία είναι φθίνουσα. Ζούμε την κορύφωση μιας ιστορικής περιόδου η οποία θα ολοκληρωθεί, ας το επαναλάβουμε, με το Κυπριακό, τα ζητήματα της Θράκης και του Αιγαίου ([*]: Από ρεαλιστική σκοπιά το ζήτημα της Ηπείρου είναι δυσκολότερο και πιο επικίνδυνο από αυτό της Π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Για ένα σοβαρό και με αυτοπεποίθηση πολιτικά και διπλωματικά κράτος -το οποίο βέβαια εμπιστεύονται οι πολίτες του- σαφώς και το ζήτημα της Π.Γ.Δ.Μ μπορεί να μετατραπεί σε πλεονέκτημα).

Όταν κάποιος έχει επίγνωση και αντίληψη αυτής της ιστορικής πορείας, χαμογελάει με τα «πολιτικά κόμματα» (τα οποία αποτελούν διαχειριστές αυτής της πορείας, πορεία την οποία επιδιώκουν να νομιμοποιήσουν, να σχετικοποιήσουν, να εκλογικεύσουν ή/και να υποβαθμίσουν) και με τους «προβληματισμούς» ή τα «σημαντικά ζητήματα» που κυριαρχούν στη «δημόσια σφαίρα» και στην «κοινή γνώμη» -υπό τη συνοδεία των Μ.Μ.Ε- τα τελευταία χρόνια.


Σημειώσεις

Οι φάσεις είναι τρεις: Το έθνος ευρύτερο από το κράτος. Το έθνος συμπίπτει με το κράτος. Το έθνος μαραζώνει, γερνάει, κατακερματίζεται, συνθλίβεται και εν τέλει εκποιείται από το κράτος (και τα προηγούμενα δίχως να αναφερθούμε στις ιστορικού τύπου αλλοιώσεις που επέφερε το κράτος στο κοινωνικό σώμα, στην πολιτιστική χιμπατζιδοποίηση μας κ.λπ).

Υπό αυτή την ευρύτερη οπτική που θέτει το κείμενο δεν θα πρέπει να ξαφνιάζεται κάνεις με συμπτώματα ή με μηχανισμούς μαζικής ψυχολογίας όπως: η παρακμή και η προκλητικότητα που έχει εγκαθιδρυθεί σε τομείς του κράτους όπως αυτούς της παιδείας, της άμυνας, των εσωτερικών (αναφέρομαι και σε παλαιότερες κυβερνήσεις) ή ένας υστερικός «ευρωπαϊσμός» που εκβάλλει σε νευρωσικού τύπου συμπεριφορές, αποκτά ψυχωσικά χαρακτηριστικά και αγγίζει τα όρια της φαιδρότητας ή γελοιότητας (περίπου σαν αντιστροφή του υπεραναπληρωτικού νευρωτικού «εθνικισμού» τύπου Χ.Α) κ.λπ. Στο κείμενο Η «Ευρώπη» ως προκάλυμμα, πριν λίγους μήνες είχα γράψει:

Στην Ελλάδα, η «Ευρώπη», έχει μεταλλαχθεί σε κάτι άλλο από αυτό που πραγματικά είναι. Η «Ευρώπη» είναι το προκάλυμμα -ή η εκλογίκευση- της παραίτησης των Ελλήνων από την προσπάθεια τους να υπάρχουν ως στοιχειωδώς αυτοτελές και διακριτό υποκείμενο.

7 Νοεμβρίου 2015

Weapons of Mass Migration. Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy by Kelly M. Greenhill: I) Seminar (Oxford Department of International Development) II) Book Description, Contents and Reviews (Cornell University Press) III) Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion (Article).

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I
Seminar by Professor Kelly M Greenhill
Oxford Department of International Development

In this seminar, Professor Greenhill examines an understudied, yet relatively common, bargaining tool and method of persuasion: namely, the use of migration and refugee crises as non-military instruments of state-level coercion. Who employs this unconventional weapon, how often it succeeds and fails, how and why this kind of coercion ever works, and how targets may combat this unorthodox brand of coercion will be explored. Contemporary cases, including Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba and Kosovo are discussed, as are the sometimes-devastating humanitarian implications of engineered migration crises. The talk is drawn in part from Professor Greenhill's book of the same name, which received the International Studies Association's Best Book of the Year Award. Listen to the 7 May seminar by Professor Kelly M Greenhill (Tufts University), part of the Trinity term 2014 Public Seminar Series

The Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) was founded in 1982 as part of the Oxford Department of International Development (Queen Elizabeth House) at the University of Oxford.


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II
Weapons of Mass Migration
Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy
Kelly M. Greenhill

Description, Contents and Reviews

Winner, 2011 International Studies Association Best Book Award. Cornell University Press | Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

Description

At first glance, the U.S. decision to escalate the war in Vietnam in the mid-1960s, China's position on North Korea's nuclear program in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the EU resolution to lift what remained of the arms embargo against Libya in the mid-2000s would appear to share little in common. Yet each of these seemingly unconnected and far-reaching foreign policy decisions resulted at least in part from the exercise of a unique kind of coercion, one predicated on the intentional creation, manipulation, and exploitation of real or threatened mass population movements.

In Weapons of Mass Migration, Kelly M. Greenhill offers the first systematic examination of this widely deployed but largely unrecognized instrument of state influence. She shows both how often this unorthodox brand of coercion has been attempted (more than fifty times in the last half century) and how successful it has been (well over half the time). She also tackles the questions of who employs this policy tool, to what ends, and how and why it ever works. Coercers aim to affect target states' behavior by exploiting the existence of competing political interests and groups, Greenhill argues, and by manipulating the costs or risks imposed on target state populations.

This "coercion by punishment" strategy can be effected in two ways: the first relies on straightforward threats to overwhelm a target's capacity to accommodate a refugee or migrant influx; the second, on a kind of norms-enhanced political blackmail that exploits the existence of legal and normative commitments to those fleeing violence, persecution, or privation. The theory is further illustrated and tested in a variety of case studies from Europe, East Asia, and North America. To help potential targets better respond to—and protect themselves against—this kind of unconventional predation, Weapons of Mass Migration also offers practicable policy recommendations for scholars, government officials, and anyone concerned about the true victims of this kind of coercion—the displaced themselves.

Contents

Introduction - 1. Understanding the Coercive Power of Mass Migrations - 2. The 1994 Cuban Balseros Crisis and Its Historical Antecedents - 3. “Now the Refugees Are the War”: NATO and the Kosovo Conflict - 4. An Invasion to Stop the Invasion: The United States and the Haitian Boatpeople Crises - 5. North Korean Migrants, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Nuclear Weapons - 6. Conclusions and Policy Implications - Appendix: Coding Cases of Coercive Engineered Migration.

Reviews

Press Reviews
"Greenhill explains the use of state-engineered migration as a tool of coercive statecraft in the post–World War II era. She rightly points out that this rather insidious means of political suasion has been used numerous times over the relatively short period examined, and with a striking degree of success. Weapons of Mass Migration is innovative, well written, rigorously researched, and timely. It is both theoretically innovative and policy relevant, and will likely spur several new paths for IR research and migration studies."—Perspectives on Politics

"An innovative and beautifully written analysis of how, and to what extent, refugee flows are exploited by states in order to affect policy options taken and decisions made by their counterparts."—Journal of Refugee Studies

"A new, authoritative look at forced displacement, skillfully linking politics to migrations. This combination moves beyond migration as a single focused topic and connects it to choices within foreign policy. Any student of demography, conflict, and politics will be well served by this exploration of the interaction between government control, migration, and the willingness of populations to move."—Political Science Quarterly

"Weapons of Mass Migration is the most theoretically developed and well-researched study of the strategic uses of emigration to date. It not only is a valuable contribution to the literature on forced migration but speaks to broader themes in IR. Greenhill highlights how weak actors use forced migration as a coercive tool, how humanitarian norms interact with tangible costs, and how actors use political discord within their targets to their advantage. This book places the study of migration squarely within the field of IR."—International Studies Review


Experts
"Kelly M. Greenhill's Weapons of Mass Migration shines a bright light on strategically engineered migration. And this is, unfortunately, no minor issue. The reader is astounded by how many times states have engaged in such violent action. Greenhill gives the subject the attention it deserves, skillfully unpacks why some states engage in forced migration while others do not, discovers interesting theoretical twists, and derives tractable policy recommendations."—Michael Barnett, Harold Stassen Chair at the Hubert H. Humphrey School, University of Minnesota

"Weapons of Mass Migration is a truly valuable contribution. This incisive book highlights an unconventional and nonmilitary method of state-to-state coercion—why and how weak states increasingly deploy the threat or reality of 'strategic engineered migration' to achieve political goals that would otherwise be unattainable. The book argues convincingly that this underappreciated form of interstate 'political blackmail' is both more frequent and more effective than commonly supposed. Its most likely targets are liberal democracies whose human rights commitments and diverse political interest groups can be exploited to impose what the author terms 'hypocrisy costs' upon any government that resists such coerced outmigration. Yet even authoritarian states such as modern China are vulnerable, as the North Koreans have shown. This book unveils an effective weapon of asymmetric statecraft that has been 'hiding in plain sight.' It deserves attention from all those interested in emerging patterns of international relations and human rights."—Michael S. Teitelbaum, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and Harvard Law School

"Kelly M. Greenhill’s fine analysis gives a double meaning to the notion of weapons of the weak: tin-pot dictators try to get bargaining leverage over neighboring democracies by threatening to swamp them with refugees. This has happened on average once a year over the past half century. Those interested in refugees or in creative bargaining tactics will be fascinated by this tale."—Jack Snyder, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations, Columbia University



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III
Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion
Article by Kelly M. Greenhill

Coercion is generally understood to refer to the practice of inducing or preventing changes in political behavior through the use of threats, intimidation, or some other form of pressure—most commonly, military force. This article focuses on a very particular nonmilitary method of applying coercive pressure—the use of migration and refugee crises as instruments of persuasion. Conventional wisdom suggests this kind of coercion is rare at best. Traditional international relations theory avers that it should rarely succeed. In fact, given the asymmetry in capabilities that tends to exist between would be coercers and their generally more powerful targets, it should rarely even be attempted. However, as this article demonstrates, not only is this kind of coercion attempted far more frequently than the accepted wisdom would suggest but that it also tends to succeed far more often than capabilities-based theories would predict.

The article is organized as follows: I begin by outlining the logic behind the coercive use of purposefully created migration and refugee crises and discuss its relative—if under-recognized—prevalence. In the second section, I briefly describe the kind of actors who resort to the use of this unconventional weapon as well as highlight the diverse array of objectives sought by those who employ it. I also show that this kind of coercion has proven relatively successful, at least as compared to more traditional methods of persuasion, particularly against (generally more powerful) liberal democratic targets. In the third section, I propose an explanation for why democracies appear to have been most frequently (and most successfully) targeted. I also advance my broader theory about the nature of migration-driven coercion, including how, why, and under what conditions it can prove efficacious. I conclude with a brief discussion of broader implications and further applications of the theory.



About Kelly M Greenhill
Kelly M Greenhill is Associate Professor at Tufts University and Research Associate and Chair of the Conflict, Security and Public Policy Working Group at Harvard Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center (BCSIA). Shel also serves as Associate Editor of the journal Security Studies. Much of her research focuses on the use of military force and what are frequently called 'new security challenges', including civil wars; the use of forced migration as a weapon; military intervention and (counter-) insurgency; foreign and defence policy; and international crime as a challenge to domestic governance.

She is author of Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs), co-author and co-editor of Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict (Cornell) and The Use of Force, 8th edition.

Outside of academia, Professor Greenhill has served as a consultant to the US government as well as to the Ford Foundation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Bank.

2 Νοεμβρίου 2015

Ένα σύντομο σχόλιο με αφορμή το άρθρο «Δύο αιώνες μνημόνια για την Ελλάδα» και τη μελέτη του Brookings Institution «The pitfalls of external dependence: Greece, 1829-2015» (συνημμένα και τα δύο κείμενα).

Ας αναδείξουμε ένα σημαντικό ζήτημα. Στο άρθρο του Γιάννη Παλαιολόγου με τίτλο ''Δύο αιώνες μνημόνια για την Ελλάδα'', διαβάζω: «Η μελέτη του Brookings καταλογίζει άτεγκτη στάση στους επίσημους πιστωτές της Ελλάδας τους τελευταίους δύο αιώνες, θεωρώντας τους εν πολλοίς υπαίτιους για τη μεγάλη διάρκεια και το βαρύ κόστος των ελληνικών χρεοκοπιών».

Ο αρθρογράφος μετά από αυτήν την παρατήρηση, παραμερίζει τις ομοιότητες και προσπαθεί να καταδείξει τη «διαφορά» σε σχέση με τις προηγούμενες χρεοκοπίες. Εν συνεχεία επανέρχεται προκειμένου να ερμηνεύσει το «επαναλαμβανόμενο μοτίβο» των χρεοκοπιών της Ελλάδας επικαλούμενος τον Κώστα Κωστή, ο οποίος θεωρεί ως αιτία για αυτή την επανάληψη την «διαχρονική αποτυχία του ελληνικού πολιτικού συστήματος... να αντιμετωπίσει έγκαιρα τα προβλήματα στην οικονομία... να τα διαχειριστεί όταν οι συνθήκες γίνονται δυσμενέστερες» κ.λπ. Η ανικανότητα και η ανεπάρκεια είναι γνωστή (από που προκύπτει άραγε;). Αρκεί όμως;

Ας δούμε τι ισχυρίζεται κάποιος άλλος κύριος ονόματι Άγγελος Αγγελόπουλος (μπορείτε να σκεφτείτε με όρους ad hominem αλλά θα χάσετε την ουσία). Ανάμεσα σε άλλα σημαντικά, λοιπόν, γράφει ο Α. Α, στο έργο του ''Οικονομικά'', τα εξής:

«Τα εξωτερικά δάνεια που συνήφθησαν κατά την πρώτην περίοδον, δηλ. από της επαναστάσεως του 1821 μέχρι της πτωχεύσεως του 1893, εγένοντο δε υπό όρους καταθλιπτικούς δια το ελληνικόν δημόσιον... Τα συναφθέντα μεταγενέστερως δάνεια εγένοντο μεν υπό ευνοϊκώτερους όρους, αλλά συνολικά, ημπορεί να λεχθή, ότι καμμιά άλλη χώρα δεν έτυχε τόσο βαρείας μεταχειρίσεως εκ μέρους των ξένων δανειστών (υψηλοί τόκοι, επεμβάσεις εις τα εσωτερικά, διεθνής οικονομικός έλεγχος, εταιρεία υπέγγυων προσόδων κ.λπ.).

Δια να λάβει κανείς μιαν γενικήν ιδέαν της επιβαρύνσεως της Ελλάδος, αναφέρω εδώ δύο χαρακτηριστικούς αριθμούς. Τα ποσά, τα οποία πραγματικά εισέπραξε η Ελλάς από τα εξωτερικά δάνεια από της επαναστάσεως του 1821 μέχρι το 1932, όποτε και εσταμάτησε ο εξωτερικός δανεισμός, ανήλθον εις 2.200 εκατ. χρυσά φράγκα. Δια τα δάνεια αυτά ο προϋπολογισμός κατέβαλε δια τόκους και χρεωλύσια μέχρι των παραμονών του πολέμου 2.383 εκατ. χρυσά φράγκα, δηλ. 183 εκατ. χρυσά φράγκα, περισσότερα από εκείνα που εισέπραξε.

Εν τούτοις, την 31ην Μαρτίου 1932 εποχήν που εσταμάτησε ο δανεισμός, το ποσόν του χρέους που ώφειλεν ακόμη η Ελλάς, ανήρχετο πάλιν εις 2 δισεκατομμύρια χρυσά φράγκα...

Το πράγμα φαίνεται απίστευτον και όμως είναι αληθές. Και σημαίνει πολλά.

Σημαίνει πρωτίστως, ότι η Ελλάς ανταπεκρίθη δια των ιδίων της δυνάμεων εις τας τεράστιας ανάγκας που αντιμετώπισε κατά τα 125 χρόνια του ελεύθερου της βίου. Σημαίνει ακόμη, ότι ο εξωτερικός δανεισμός δεν ήτο, παρά το πρόσχημα της κερδοσκοπίας του ξένου κεφαλαίου, που η εισροή του εις την χώραν ήτο σχεδόν ίση με την εκροή που εγένετο την αυτήν περίοδον δια την εξυπηρέτησιν παλαιότερων δανείων. Σημαίνει τέλος, ότι η πτωχή Ελλάς εξώφλησεν εις το ακέραιον τα ξένα κεφάλαια, που εδανείσθη' και τα ποσά που παρουσιάζονται σήμερα ως οφειλή, δεν αποτελούν παρά τους υπερβολικούς τόκους, την υπό άρτιον έκδοσιν και τα παντός είδους προμήθειας των διαφόρων Τραπεζών. Υπό τας συνθήκας αυτάς δεν είναι ανεξήγητον, πως η Ελλάς περιήλθεν επανειλημμένως μέχρι τούδε εις πτωχεύσεις.

Αιτία των πτωχεύσεων αυτών δεν ήτο η κακή πίστης της Ελλάδος, αλλά η τακτική των ξένων ομολογιούχων.

Πως ήτο δυνατόν να ορθοποδήση μια χώρα υπό τέτοιους όρους; Κάθε νέον συναπτόμενον δάνειον, εκτός των δυσμενών όρων της εκδόσεως επεβαρύνετο και με όλας τας καθυστερούμενας οφειλάς των προηγούμενων δανείων. Το εις διάθεσιν του ελληνικού δημοσίου απομένον ποσόν ήτο ανεπαρκές δια την εξυπηρέτησιν του σκοπού, δια τον οποίον συνήπτετο. Έτσι, η προσφυγή εις νέον πάλιν δάνειον ήτο αναγκαία.

Μόλις σταματούσε ο δανεισμός, η κρίσης καθίστατο αναπόφευκτος.

Το ερώτημα συνεπώς που τίθεται (ως προς το επαναλαμβανόμενο μοτίβο, τη μεγάλη διάρκεια και το βαρύ κόστος), είναι: Brookings και Άγγελος Αγγελόπουλος από τη μια μεριά ή Κώστας Κωστής από την άλλη;


-----
- Ακολουθούν συνημμένα το άρθρο του Γιάννη Παλαιολόγου και η μελέτη από το Brookings Institution.

- Τα κείμενα καλό είναι να διαβαστούν καθώς -εννοείται πως- οικονομική ιστορία της Ελλάδας δεν γνωρίζουμε σε αυτόν εδώ τον τόπο. Αλλά γνωρίζουμε τα πάντα για άλλες χώρες ή για την «παγκόσμια» οικονομική ιστορία.

- Το κείμενο της Καθημερινής τελειώνει αναφερόμενο στην ίδρυση της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδας το 1928. Λίγο μετά, θα χαρακτήριζαν κάποιοι την Ελλάδα «Προτεκτοράτο της Τραπέζης Χάμπρο» [Hambros Bank και Société Générale;].

- Τα σημειώματα «επικαιρότητας» και οι αναφορές μου περί κυριαρχίας, client state, εξάρτησης και πατρωνίας σχετίζονται με τα προηγούμενα.

- Μη ξεχνάμε πως και σήμερα, δεν υπάρχει ορθολογικός τρόπος ερμηνείας (με βάση αποκλειστικά και μόνο εσωτερικά κριτήρια) της σφοδρότητας, της έκτασης και του βάθους της κρίσης.


.~`~.


31 Οκτωβρίου 2015

An Agent-Based Model of the Acquisition of U.S. Client States - Part I.

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Εισαγωγή

Προτού περάσουμε στο πρώτο μέρος της μελέτης των Stephen Majeski (University of Washington) και David Sylvan (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva) με θέμα «An Agent-Based Model of the Acquisition of U.S. Client States» προηγείται μια σύντομη περιγραφή της έννοιας client-state (κράτος-πελάτης) και της σχέσης του με τον πάτρωνα (patron state) [και μια συμπληρωματική αναφορά στην έννοια του «προτεκτοράτου», η οποία αν και ξεπερασμένη έχει την αξία της]. H περιγραφή είναι από το έργο Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy:

A client state is country that is economically, politically, and/or militarily dependent upon another state - usually a great power. The relationship is a bilateral, and normally beneficial one, with mutual, although different, obligations. The client state tends to be one that is diplomatically isolated, if not an actual 'pariah state', due to its policies or the circumstances of its creation. It is often militarily powerful but economically weak.

Contemporary examples of client states during the Cold War were Israel and South Korea for the United States, and Syria, Iraq, Libya and Ethiopia for the Soviet Union. But client states are not a phenomenon exclusive to the twentieth century. Nineteenth-century Europe saw the Balkan states, for example, as clients of the great powers.

The patron supplies the client with arms and uses its influence and veto on the client's behalf in the United Nations and other international organizations in exchange for the client's military and intelligence services. Thus both Israel and Syria provided their respective patrons with captured weapons, intelligence about the activities of the rival superpower in the region and access to port facilities and airfields. The client is not, however, the patron's puppet... The client is able to exercise this independence because of its regional importance as a Trojan Horse for its patron or because of support for it within the domestic political structure of the patron state.

Both superpowers (the USA and the USSR) found clients among states that were considered part of the 'periphery' in regional sub-systems due to their ethnic and historical differences from the majority of states in the region. Other states became clients when the circumstances of their creation led them to become diplomatically isolated in the international community. Often a state becomes a client because it is the enemy of the rival patron's client... However, because they had invested so much in a client, the super-power patrons were loath to terminate the relationship. They also feared that if too much was required of the client, it would attempt to seek another patron, as did Egypt in 1974-1975 and Somalia in 1977.

The United States has traditionally feared the loss of a client due to a military coup or a popular revolt overthrowing a ruler rather than due to a ruler seeking a change of patron.

Protectorates are dependent or not fully sovereign states. Because they were often deemed too weak and lacking in organizational structure to be responsible for meeting their external obligations under international law, they were legally restricted. The territorial integrity of a protectorate was guaranteed under a treaty negotiated with the protecting power. In most cases, these territories were being 'protected' from other great powers, to the benefit of the 'protecting power'. Very often, the 'protected' state formed an important link in an imperial chain, had geostrategic value and provided financial and trade benefits, allowing the great power a way of protecting its empire more economically than outright annexation or colonization would permit. Indigenous dynastic interests were generally guaranteed domestically, but external action was severely circumscribed... Attempts to establish joint protectorate control over Morocco and Ethiopia were examples of semi-protectorates, sometimes called international protectorates... Protecting powers were few in number. The imperial powers of Britain, France, Russia and the United States shared a near-monopoly in the field. A new type of subservient state came into existence in Eastern Europe under Soviet communist control after the Second World War. Essentially tie facto protectorates, they were legally independent of external control and were called 'satellites'... Partly to block the resurgence of protectorates, the United Nations Charter provides for the right of self-determination for all peoples, and a General Assembly resolution of 1960 called for the independence of all territories and the end of colonialism.

Η Hellenic Republic αποτελεί περίπτωση υποχωρητικού, υποτακτικού και μη διεκδικητικού client state το οποίο κατά περιόδους υποτροπιάζει σε χειρότερες μορφές. Την περίοδο που διανύουμε παρατηρείται η παρακμή ή η αυτονόμηση των πελατειακών κρατών ή κρατών-πελατών των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών. Το Ισραήλ, η Τουρκία και η Σαουδική Αραβία αποτελούν χαρακτηριστικές περιπτώσεις πελατειακών κρατών που αυτονομούνται ή προσπαθούν να αυτονομηθούν (και να κερδίσουν βαθμούς ελευθερίας) από τον πάτρωνα τους. Η Ελλάδα αποτελεί περίπτωση πελατειακού κράτους που παρακμάζει. Το Ιράκ, η Βοσνία-Ερζεγοβίνη και η Συρία αποτελούν περιπτώσεις κρατών-πελατών που διαλύονται (αργά ή γρήγορα, ενδογενώς ή εξωγενώς). Η Σιγκαπούρη και η Νορβηγία αποτελούν περιπτώσεις πρώην πελατειακών κρατών που αναβαθμίστηκαν στο status του κυρίαρχου κράτους.

Είτε θα γίνεις κυρίαρχο κράτος (και όχι subordinate σε υπερεθνικούς παράγοντες) είτε η μοίρα σου θα είναι η λιβανοποίηση, βοσνιοποίηση, φινλανδοποίηση, πορτορικανοποίηση σου (στο πιο «ευρωπαικό» και μεταμοντέρνο).



David Sylvan
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
sylvan@hei.unige.ch

Stephen Majeski
University of Washington
majeski@u.washington.edu

Paper prepared for presentation at the 44th Annual Convention of the International Studies. Association, Portland, February 25 - March 1, 2003


Abstract

United States foreign policy in the twentieth century has arguably been built around the creation and protection of client states. This tendency both antedates the cold war and continues after its end. We lay out the elements of a theory of U.S. client state acquisition (for the entire period from 1898 to the present) based on two motives, each with several associated mechanisms: helping “endangered” states from “enemies” in the region; and “getting one’s ducks in a row” to prepare a war or set up alignments to ward off a new one. In both cases, client status is consensually arranged between the U.S. and the client; ceiling and diffusion effects may also enter into client acquisition. These mechanisms are then modelled using simulation; the model contains certain agent-based elements. Preliminary analysis of the model indicates that 1) the model generates fairly stable results; 2) it tracks the historical cycles in US client acquisition (periodic spikes) fairly well though it systematically under represents the number of clients that the US accumulates.


Introduction

In a series of papers, we have argued that one of the fundamental components of U.S. foreign policy for over a century has been the acquisition and protection of client states. United States security and well-being is seen as revolving around the maintenance of particular regime types in various states; and from time to time, U.S. officials have felt it important to take on (but not, apparently, to discard) additional clients. This policy, moreover, has been largely unchanged since the U.S. first began to expand overseas. Of course, the mechanisms of U.S. client maintenance are considerably more sophisticated now than they earlier were, and the U.S. reach is now global in a way that might have been seen as exaggerated in earlier, supposedly isolationist periods. By the same token, the U.S. has in the last century gone through at least three major eras, with the Cold War as demarcator. Nonetheless, we would argue that the continuities of U.S. policy, as regards the acquisition and protection of clients, far outweigh the historical differences.

In making this claim, we have for the most part been focusing more on the maintenance of client states than on their acquisition in the first place. Thus, the U.S. reacts toward its clients in remarkably similar ways, no matter whether we are talking about Santo Domingo in 1903 or Bosnia in 1995. For example, when a client is in trouble -- say from domestic opposition seen as likely to endanger the regime type -- the U.S. will predictably opt for an escalation ladder, involving increasingly “noisy” means (whether by itself or via proxies), each taken over from tasks the client is deemed as unable to accomplish. Such means of protecting clients, we have argued, stem to a considerable degree from micro-processes of how U.S. foreign policy recommendations are put together, chosen among, and called into question. Those microprocesses are discernible over decades, and we see no sign of changes in either them or the policies they generate.

However, the fact that client states are maintained in the same way now as in the past tells us little about why they became client states to begin with. If clients were never, to paraphrase the famous phrase about the British Empire, acquired in a fit of absent-mindedness, the circumstances of their acquisition vary considerably. Some were swept up in en bloc, as part of a general policy of alliance-construction; others, gradually and with considerable trepidation, as the least bad way of responding to particular, highly specific dangers. We have shown elsewhere how much the process of client acquisition depends on the client’s being seen as having clearly demarcated place characteristics; but those characteristics, in turn, can be highly varied.

The issue, then, is whether it is possible to come up with one or more mechanisms of client state acquisition capable of accounting for the apparently broad range of U.S. motives over the last century. This paper puts forward two such mechanisms which, we argue, are at the core of client acquisition in almost every instance of its occurrence (the two, which we shall discuss below, are Israel and Saudi Arabia). Those mechanisms, in turn, give rise to temporal and spatial patterns of acquisition which track quite well actual historical patterns; they also suggest likely future scenarios and shed light on certain counterfactual situations.

This paper is divided into four parts. We begin with a conceptual discussion of what client status means and how it has worked for the United States historically. We then turn to a discussion of the two acquisition mechanisms, explaining each one and illustrating it with several examples. Next, we formalize these mechanisms as an agent-based computational model, “walking through” the model’s code (it is written in Java, and implemented in the RePast simulation environment). Finally, we present the results of the model’s simulation, both in terms of its “fit” with the historical patterns discussed above and in terms of particularly interesting trends and counterfactuals.


Client States

At least as far back as ancient Rome, powerful political units have acted through a network of clients. To the patron, the advantages of having clients rather than, say, imperial provinces are twofold: the administrative and political costs of administering clients are considerably less than those occasioned by direct rule; and to have clients (referred to by the Romans as “friends”) is significantly more flattering to one’s self-image as a free political unit than to have subjects. Counterbalancing these benefits, of course, is an obvious disadvantage: clients, by virtue of their formal independence, are often obstreperous and able to manipulate the patron for their own ends. If two or more clients enter into conflict with each other, or if they are judged to be utterly incompetent, the patron will feel compelled to step in; this, historically, is how client networks were transformed into formal empires.

The reverse is also true. When imperial provinces revolt, especially when such revolts take place simultaneously or in rapid succession, the costs of putting down the rebellion are often too high for the empire as a whole to be maintained. The temptation is then great to grant formal independence to the remaining provinces. If regimes deemed to be compliant can be set up (often staffed by former provincial officials and by bureaucrats from the metropole), provinces can be transformed into clients. This, in sum, is what the French and to a lesser degree the British succeeded in doing during the era of decolonization; it is what the Russians have been attempting after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

As these examples illustrate, client state networks also require considerable resources to maintain. Frequently, the patron needs to provide economic and military aid; and if the client in question is faced with an insurgency, the patron also needs to move troops and ships to help in stamping out the revolt. This can be an expensive proposition, particularly over long distances and in the face of well-armed rebel forces. Similarly, the costs of maintaining military bases are quite high. These various resource requirements help explain why the British engaged in successive retrenchments and why, quite apart from any concerns about democracy, the French have found it increasingly difficult to maintain their network of African clients.

For several decades, the United States has had the single largest network of client states. They fall into several, quite distinctive, categories. First come states with whom the U.S. has a formal military alliance. These include most of Latin America (via the Rio Pact); the original and some of the more recent NATO countries; Australia and New Zealand; Japan; and South Korea. A second group comprises states with whom the U.S. has intimate military ties, furnishing extensive military aid and maintaining close links with the indigenous armed forces. These include several states in the Middle East, such as Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia; they also include states with whom the U.S. formerly was allied, such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan, or with whom there are long-standing political links, such as Indonesia and, for many decades, Ethiopia. Most states in this category also receive extensive U.S. economic aid. Third come pro-Western states with whom the U.S. has close economic and military ties. These include various states in the Caribbean and Pacific, as well as several African countries, such as Uganda and, formerly, Liberia fell into this category for many decades. Since the (first) Gulf War, several states in the Red Sea or Gulf area would also be included here. Fourth are formally neutral but pro-Western states with whom the U.S. maintains not only significant economic connections but, increasingly, military links as well: Sweden is the most prominent case in point. Fifth, although their status as U.S. clients is by no means firmly cemented, are several newly independent states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, such as Bosnia, Tajikistan, and, most recently, Afghanistan. In our view, at least 60 states today are American clients.

What these states all have in common is that the maintenance of their type of regime (though not by any means the individual leaders or political groupings comprising any given regime) is a) considered by the U.S. government as a legitimate matter of concern, which b) is worth considerable political and, if need be, economic and military efforts, should it be seen as endangered. In addition, the dominant political forces in each of these states also c) consider that characteristics a) and b) are themselves normal and legitimate. This, then, is a more complete definition of client states.

In order for regime maintenance to be an American goal and for that goal to be accepted as legitimate by the regime, the U.S. must receive explicit permission to engage in surveillance. This phenomenon is at the core of the concept of a client, and serves both as a measurement criterion for categorizing states and as a distinctive feature separating patron-client relations from related phenomena such as alliances. As a measurement criterion, looking for whether or not surveillance exists leads us to treaties and executive agreements permitting the U.S. to have military attachés and other sorts of overseers, but also, and more fundamentally, to the types of activities frequently reported routinely in daily cables and other messages from the embassy to Washington. This last point is important, since in the early years of the last century, U.S. bureaucratic mechanisms were not nearly as developed as they have subsequently become (e.g., military aid programs had not yet become regularized; there were no CIA stations; and so forth). By the same token, these mechanisms have now become common, so that any kind of U.S. bilateral relations with a given country are more likely than not to involve some sort of militaryto-military contacts, even if surveillance is not terribly extensive.

Patron-client relations are conceptually distinct from alliance relations. The former, as we have said, involve oversight by the patron of the client’s internal affairs, with the client giving its assent (even if reluctantly) to this oversight. Alliances, however, tend to be restricted more to external attack and, importantly, need not involve surveillance. Hence, the U.S. can be allied to a given state, in the sense of guaranteeing its security in case of external attack, but without protecting the regime in question against many potential domestic enemies. Conversely, the U.S. can oversee the client’s performance without giving the kinds of guarantees (and weapons transfers) typically involved in alliance relations (in these cases, the client frequently nags the patron for more, and more sophisticated weapons, not to mention explicit military guarantees). Of course, most clients are also allies, and vice-versa, but the two concepts are sufficiently different that they not only should be differentiated but should also be seen as not falling along a common dimension (e.g., security).

It is important to understand that client status need not involve lining up with the patron on many foreign policy matters, nor, indeed, that relations between the two are peaceful and harmonious. Clients may and often do take a stance on various items at odds with that of the patron, and this possibility may be strengthened by understandable feelings of resentment on the part of the client at its status. Since, for the patron, what counts is maintenance of regime type; this more overriding concern may even facilitate the client blackmailing the patron. However, when push comes to shove, it is understood by both sides that the patron’s basic goal and its surveillance means are legitimate. Put in standard political science terms, we can say that the status of being a patron, while undoubtedly connected with the patron being powerful or influential, in the end is conceptually distinct. Rather, patron status is in effect a mode of governance, a kind of hegemony, and one all the effective precisely for its doubly voluntary character.

It should also be pointed out that multiple levels of patron-client relations are possible. Clients of the United States can themselves be patrons for other states. What we do exclude, for logical and practical reasons, is that a client of a client is also the client of its patron’s patron, i.e., that a country like the U.S. can, as it were, reach down directly to a client while the latter also keeps its client status via, say, a former colonial power. We rule this out simply because, given the intrusiveness of surveillance and the notion of responsibility for regime-type maintenance, it simply is not possible for two patrons to be surveilling the same client for more than a limited time (in the end, the “middle” client either solves the problem or passes it to the U.S.). A second patron may extend security guarantees to the “lower” client, but it can only do so with the consent of the “middle” client, qua patron of the “lower” client.

Most U.S. clients are states with perfectly stable regime types. They do not require obtrusive surveillance or (except for economic and military aid) significant assistance. However, if the situation is deemed to warrant it, surveillance can easily become more intensive and assistance granted. Some regimes are seen as considerably more endangered. In such cases, U.S. officials engage in active policies aimed at buttressing the regime. These policies go well beyond transferring resources; they frequently involve daily advice to politicians, bureaucrats, the military, and various other political forces in the country. Of course, certain regimes are sufficiently thin in trained administrators that they rely routinely on the U.S. for advice even when there is no imminent danger in sight. At times, however, the client is faced with a problem for which its own resources, even buttressed by U.S. aid, are insufficient. In those cases, U.S. intervention may be resorted to.

We will return to this issue below, when we discuss motives for acquiring clients. With these points in mind, we can now give a kind of stylized chronology of U.S. client acquisition. It should be kept in mind that this list is neither complete nor, as of yet, entirely verified. As we indicated, client status can only be ascertained when cable traffic is examined (and not only the cables deemed most worthy of being published by the State Department’s own historians). What we did, as a second-best alternative, is to use treaties and military base agreements, along with reading through various of the volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, supplementing both with particular secondary sources. It will be noted that we skip over most of the 1980s, due to paucity of any kinds of primary source materials; we also surely under represent a number of small Caribbean and Pacific island states.


A Partial List of U.S. Client States, with Approximate Dates of Acquisition

1898 Cuba (ends 1959)
1900 Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic
1903 Panama
1939-40 Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil; Canada;
also Liberia (ends mid-1980s)
1943 China (ends 1949)
1945 Italy, Saudi Arabia
1946 Argentina, Philippines
1947 Greece, Turkey
1948 France, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, Austria; Korea; Israel
1949 West Germany
1950 Taiwan, Thailand
1951 Japan, Australia, New Zealand
1952 Ethiopia (ends 1974; resumes mid-1990s)
1953 Spain, Iran
1954 Pakistan
1955 South Vietnam (ends 1975)
1957 Lebanon (ends 1975)
1963 Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Jordan
1964 Laos
1967 Indonesia
1974 Tunisia
1976 Egypt
1977 Malaysia
1981 Singapore
1982 Belize
1984 Brunei
...
1991-92 Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Djibouti
1994 Uganda, Bosnia

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Some notes on particular cases: South American states had mostly economic ties with the U.S. until the late 1930s, when in preparation for a possible war, swarms of military attachés were sent south and surveillance began on a large scale. Italy was occupied by U.S. troops, but was a recognized state by 1945; Truman was ready to intervene overtly to prevent a domestic Communist takeover even before the CIA’s efforts in the 1948 elections. In 1948, the Marshall Plan went into effect and its counterpart funds mechanism provided a powerful means of surveillance; interestingly, the Swiss, who participated in the Plan, were given an exemption from counterpart fund control; the Irish, who also participated, had most of their funds semi-controlled by the UK (and therefore remained a client of the UK for decades more); see Till Geiger, “Why Ireland Needed the Marshall Plan but did not Want It: Ireland, the Sterling Area and the European Recovery Program, 1947-1948,” paper, Queen’s University of Belfast. Sweden, in spite of being a neutral, participated eagerly in the Plan and also, although refusing NATO membership, established close military ties with the U.S. Dates for Japan and Australia and New Zealand are cautious, depending for the first on dates of the peace treaty and for the latter two on the economic mechanisms involved in the security arrangements negotiated that year. Iran was offered aid (and accepted some of it) earlier, but only after Mossadeq’s overthrow were full surveillance mechanisms put in place. Jordan was offered client status in the Eisenhower Doctrine but its refusal led the U.S. to continue letting Britain remain as its patron for some years further, when Hussein’s entreaties became too insistent to ignore. Indonesia could be entered a year earlier, during the immediate chaos of the countercoup, but not back in the 1950s, even when the U.S. gave up the idea of fomenting a military revolt against Sukarno. Tunisia could be as early as 1968, depending on the weight given to particular military accords. Bosnia is highly ambiguous: it was on a client trajectory (see Holbrooke’s memoirs) by 1994, but surveillance now seems devolved on the European Union. The cases of Afghanistan, Qatar, and Tajikistan are too recent (and involve too many secret agreements) to be sure if they are full-fledged clients, or merely are military bases and the recipients of security guarantees.
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It is evident that these clients were not acquired in a single, continuous process. There were major waves of acquisition, following or preceding wars; there were also frequent, near-yearly acquisitions in the late 1940s, the 1950s, and portions of the 1960s and 1970s. (These two patterns will be at the core of our discussion, below, of the two motives and mechanisms for client acquisition.) By the same token, some of these cases involved formal military alliances, others, bilateral, at times informal, arrangements (for example, Israel was mostly supplied with weapons by European states throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s; the U.S. eschewed formal military arrangements in those years; yet on an annual basis, top Israeli ministers visited Washington and bargained over weapons and economic assistance).

Just as the temporal pattern and institutional modalities of U.S. client acquisition fall roughly into two categories, so too do the statuses of those clients prior to the moment of their acquisition. On the one hand, there are a number of states which were not only independent for a long time but indeed were not clients of any other state; this is the case for many Western European states and also the South American and, to a certain degree, the Central American ones (the establishment of the state of Panama is an egregious counter-example). On the other hand, there are many states, notably in Asia and the Middle East, which used to be colonies of a European state. The U.S. “took over” many of these clients because either they were no longer under the surveillance of a patron or their former colonial master, as patron, was deemed to be incompetent in protecting them from danger. In either case, the client was facing a problem which it was unable to solve on its own, or even with the help of its European patron. In the latter circumstance, we can see the U.S. as “inheriting” the client from the European patron; in the former circumstance, the U.S. “inherits” the problem from the client itself.

Note that in its pattern of involvement in Asia and the Middle East (and to some degree in the Western Hemisphere as well), the U.S. has opted over and over for a different mode of governance. European states, for the most part, established colonies; the U.S., with rare exceptions, did not. While it is true that the Europeans have themselves set up clients (the British did this extensively in the 19th century and the French in Africa after independence), this is far less prevalent among them than it is for the U.S. There may be deep historical or ideological roots to this European/American difference; but what is clear is that the U.S. pattern is precisely a consistent pattern, with vanishingly few exceptions.

Of course, not all U.S. clients remain in that status. At times, revolutions or other domestic upheavals result in major changes in regime type, leading to the “loss” of the client. Often, the U.S. is led to intervene overtly or covertly to contain or head off such upheavals, and there are no guarantees that intervention of this sort will succeed. (The issue of intervention has until recently been the principal focus of our research.) Nonetheless, we would observe that the U.S. has a fairly successful track record: most of its clients stay in that status for many decades, and rarely require intervention. It may be that this stability is due to a kind of selection bias, in which the U.S. only becomes a patron for clients it thinks can survive, but whatever the reason, some states have been U.S. clients for over a century now. This also suggests that states do not “graduate” from client status. Even if things look stable and there is no sense of urgency, the U.S. will routinely cast a gimlet eye on elections, investment laws, and other facets of the client’s “internal” life. Hence it was that in the mid-1970s, when it appeared for a while that the PCI might win the Italian elections, Kissinger suddenly began speaking out on Italian politics. The same is true of Mitterrand’s first term in office and, quite recently, of the various assurances sought from and given by Lula in Brazil.

Finally, and with rare exceptions, it is worth noting that the U.S. client acquisition seems to have little to do with either power or profit; instead, as we will argue below, U.S. acquisition of clients was and is undertaken to maintain or restore order and stability, which were or are at that moment threatened (or potentially threatened). Of course, American policy makers are not averse to promoting economic interests, nor are they shy about projecting power. But, as various scholars have already emphasized,10 U.S. policy is that of a hegemon, who sees itself as beset by problems which it (often reluctantly) has to solve, since its clients (who themselves may be patrons) are simply unable to do so themselves. We would note that this sense of being dragged into new commitments is not uncommon among hegemons; British policy in the nineteenth century was marked by a similar sense of self.


Why and How Does the U.S. Acquire Clients? Motives and Mechanisms

From the prior discussion, it is clear that the U.S. has been in the business of acquiring and protecting clients for a long time. Why have generations of U.S. foreign policymakers chosen to acquire clients? Since 1898, and arguably before, the United States has had political, economic and security interests to foster and protect on an increasingly global scale. For sure, particular interests have emerged, evolved, and changed. Threats, created by the particular enemies of the day that threaten those interests (revolutionaries, communists, drug traffickers, authoritarian despots, narcoterriosts, religious fanatics, kidnappers, pirates, among others), have come and gone. In our view, what has been a constant, across time and space, are the overarching U.S. goals of law and order, and stability. U.S. foreign policymakers have consistently believed that their political, economic, and security interests of the day require order and stability. From time to time, of course, those interests may indicate that certain regimes should be countered or even overthrown (or, for many decades, that U.S. clients should lose their colonial empires), but such actions are always seen as a restoration or, conversely, the initial establishment of a certain kind of just international order.

In the American view, the way in which order is indicated is via the existence of states with regimes which know their place in this order and which uphold its current principles. Such regimes must be defended; otherwise order is by definition threatened. This defense is partly against external threats; but to U.S. policymakers, the principal threats to such regimes are internal. Accordingly, existing clients must be scanned and surveilled on a regular -- ideally, a daily -- basis; and such is precisely the role of the enormous U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy as it is implanted in each U.S. client.13 (Of course, this bureaucracy took quite a while to be built up, but by the late 1940s it was well in place.) But since U.S. clients may themselves have clients, those clients too should be scanned regularly to check on their health, even if this scanning might not be as frequent or as intrusive as for U.S. clients and even if it is directed more at “sub-clients” with regimes reported already to be shaky.

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We originally had thought that the U.S. would not be surveilling clients of its clients (e.g., Britain’s clients) for the reasons presented above. However, a careful reading of one of the classic cases where the U.S. took over a client from its former patron (Greece in 1947) suggests that the U.S. was scanning the situation in the non-client for a year.
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So too should “free agents” -- i.e., clientless states -- be scanned (though not necessarily surveilled widely and deeply), since if they are threatened or plunge into chaos, this risks spreading and undermining international order. If such signs appear in either sub-clients or free agents, then, other means failing, it is a natural step for the U.S. at least to consider solving those problems itself; and this implies taking on the actor in question as a client.


Stephen Majeski - University of Washington.
David Sylvan - Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

End of Part I